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ANTITRUST'S PROTECTED CLASSESt 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought 
to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is con-
troversial.1 Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primar-
ily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship,2 
have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assump-
tion. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount 
of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe 
that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement 
initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency 
is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should be 
permitted than the Optimal Deterrence Model has recognized. 
I. THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE MODEL 
A. The Optimal Enforcement of Legal Rul~s 
The Optimal Deterrence Model had its origin in Gary Becker's 
important 1968 essay, arguing that deterrence should be the primary 
goal oflegal sanctions. 3 According to Becker, the ideal legal sanction 
would make illegal conduct unprofitable whenever condemning the 
conduct would destroy less social wealth than allowing the conduct to 
continue. Becker argues that the social cost of illegal conduct includes 
three elements: (1) the costs imposed by the conduct itself; (2) the 
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costs of detecting and apprehending suspected violators and of estab-
lishing their guilt; and (3) the costs of imposing sanctions.4 An ideal 
legal system would minimize the sum of these three costs. Unfortu-
nately, these three costs of harmful conduct are mutually dependent. 
Catching more thieves costs more money. In order to reduce the 
number of violations (cost number one), society may have to spend 
more on enforcement (cost number two), or on long prison sentences 
(cost number three). 
Antitrust enforcement in particular requires some difficult trade-
offs both because the kinds of conduct that should be condemned are 
controversial and often hard to identify, and because the costs of pros-
ecution are high. 
In an effort to reduce the sum of the three costs, antitrust law has 
developed some simplifying devices. For example, the per se rule is 
designed to reduce costs of the second type, establishing guilt, to the 
extent that it limits the need for certain types of proof. In the process, 
however, the per se rule likely increases costs of the first type, the costs 
of the conduct itself, particularly to the extent that it is overdeterrent. 
Both underdeterrent and overdeterrent rules can increase the social 
cost of conduct. For example, an underdeterrent rule that fails to 
identify and condemn every instance of predatory pricing is socially 
costly to the extent that it permits some predators to charge monopoly 
prices without sanction. But an overdeterrent rule can be just as 
costly if it forces firms to refrain from hard competition in order to 
avoid legal sanctions. In the case of an overdeterrent rule, the social 
cost is equal to the value of the hard competition that a more accurate 
rule would have produced. To the extent that the per se rule against 
cartels reduces the cost of prosecuting them, it is good; but to the ex-
tent that it prevents some efficient cartels from forming, it is harmful. 5 
The acceptance of the per se rule is based on our feeling that over the 
long run per se condemnation will result in a greater savings in prose-
cution costs than it will cause in losses from overdeterrence. A rule of 
per se legality, incidentally, imposes the same trade-off: it reduces the 
cost of prosecution, but may fail to condemn some instances of socially 
harmful conduct. 
The same can be said of punishment costs. If civil damage awards 
are too large, private plaintiffs will litigate too freely and too long. 
4. Becker, supra note 3, at 181. 
5. The physicians' maximum price fixing arrangement condemned in Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Socy., 457 U.S. 332 (1982), is probably an example of an efficient cartel. For an 
argument that many cartels are efficient, particularly in industries with high fixed costs, see L. 
TELSER, A THEORY OF EFFICIENT COOPERATION AND COMPETITION (1987). 
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The result will be an increase in costs of the second type. Further, 
excessive punishment increases the anticipated costs of a lawsuit. If 
the substantive rules are the least bit overdeterrent, firms will avoid 
some competitive, socially beneficial, but ambiguous conduct in an at-
tempt to minimize these costs. The old "automatic damages" rule in 
secondary-line Robinson-Patman Act cases is a good example of this 
kind of trade-off. Under the rule, a supplier who was found to have 
engaged in illegal price "discrimination" by selling to competing deal-
ers at different prices would have to pay damages to the disfavored 
dealer; those damages would be calculated as the price difference be-
tween the high price and low price sales multiplied by the number of 
units the plaintiff purchased (before trebling). 6 Such a rule reduced 
the costs of determining the penalty (type-three costs) but almost cer-
tainly increased type-one costs because it was overdeterrent: it im-
posed penalties so large that they prevented manufacturers from 
engaging in efficient differential pricing. 7 
These trade-offs are further complicated by the fact that antitrust 
law must deal with the problem of marginal deterrence. Deterrence 
works "because people find punishment unpleasant, and some kinds 
more unpleasant than others. Society will be better off if it can force 
violators to minimize the social costs of their violations, and violations 
are not equally costly. If both mugging and murder are punishable by 
death, the mugger has little incentive not to kill her victim. The pun-
ishment will be no greater, and the risk of apprehension and convic-
tion will in fact be lower because an important witness will have been 
eliminated. On the other hand, if mugging is punishable by six 
months in prison and murder by death, the mugger must make a more 
difficult trade-off of the much higher penalty against the greater risk of 
apprehension and conviction. 
The monopoly overcharge rule for antitrust damages - that dam-
ages before trebling equal the difference between the monopoly or car-
tel price and the presumed competitive price - is a fair example of 
marginal deterrence. The rule encourages the cartel to exact a small 
overcharge rather than a large one. Under the monopoly overcharge 
rule, the cartel must make some difficult calculations in setting its 
price. Its short-run profit-maximizing price, which it could obtain by 
equating marginal cost and marginal revenue, may provide it with the 
greatest current stream of monopoly profits. But cartels that charge 
6. For example, if an automobile manufacturer sold automobiles to a favored dealer at $8000 
and to a disfavored dealer at $9000, the disfavored dealer would be entitled to damages of $1000 
per unit sold, before trebling. 
7. The rule was upset in J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981). 
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very high prices are generally easier to detect. 8 Moreover, they gener-
ally encourage more cheating,9 and - because of the overcharge rule 
- they result in greater penalties if the cartel members are caught. 
After taking these things into account, the cartel is likely to charge less 
than its short-run profit-maximizing price. 
B. The Optimal Deterrence Model in Antitrust 
If maximizing social wealth were antitrust's only goal, its system of 
sanctions would make inefficient illegal conduct unprofitable but per-
mit efficient illegal conduct to earn a profit. Taking the social costs of 
enforcement and penalties into account, the system should condemn 
inefficient conduct if the marginal gains of enforcement are greater 
than its marginal losses - i.e., if the costs of detecting and penalizing 
the conduct are less than the social cost of the conduct thus prevented. 
Importantly, this is a long-run model because it is concerned with gen-
eral rather than special deterrence. The value of prosecution in each 
individual case is equal to the social cost of future illegal conduct that 
the prosecution will prevent. For that reason, it might be quite justi-
fiable to spend a great deal of societal resources prosecuting a particu-
lar violation whose social cost seems rather small, such as a cartel that 
is not working very well anyway, and whose sales involve a very small 
market, in order to discourage such behavior in potential cartel or-
ganizers. The social cost of the current violation can never be recov-
ered. The only effective purpose of the prosecution is to deter future 
violations. 
Optimal deterrence is a function of the anticipated profitability of 
conduct to a violator. If price fixing is calculated to produce an antici-
pated profit of $100 and society deems price fixing undesirable, the 
anticipated penalty should be something greater than $100. If it is 
less, the price fixer will fix prices even if it is absolutely certain that it 
will be caught and have to pay the penalty. 
In the real world, however, the anticipated profitability of an anti-
trust violation often bears little relationship to the losses that the viola-
tion imposes on its victims. This poses a problem for people who take 
8. A good recent illustration is New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d 1065, 1084 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988), in which colluding bidders had agreed with each other 
not to bid too high, in the belief that doing so would invite extra scrutiny from the government. 
See also Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 CouJM. 
L. REV. 295 (1987); Block, Nold & Sidak, supra note 2, at 431. 
9. The greater the difference between marginal cost and the cartel price, the more individual 
cartel members will be tempted to make secret sales in excess of their cartel output quotas. See 
H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1 (1985). 
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seriously the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act Io which creates 
the private treble damage action for federal antitrust violations. Sec-
tion 4 unambiguously commands that the victim of an antitrust viola-
tion shall recover threefold the damages "by him sustained." The 
statute insists that damages be measured by the victim's losses rather 
than the violator's gains. In many cases the Optimal Deterrence 
Model requires measurement formulae for damages that are flatly in-
consistent with the statute. I I 
The degree of inconsistency between the Optimal Deterrence 
Model and the statutory language varies with the type of injury. If the 
defendant is a monopolist or cartel member and the plaintiffs are pur-
chasers seeking damages based on a monopoly overcharge, the differ-
ence is relatively small. The profitability of a cartel is a function of the 
size of the overcharge, and the overcharge, of course, is also the mea-
sure of the purchaser's injuries. Although the equation is generally 
more complicated than this, Iz there is sometimes a good correlation 
between optimal and statutory damages in overcharge injury cases. 
The great majority of antitrust cases, however, are much more 
problematic. Most plaintiffs are competitors, potential competitors, 
suppliers, terminated dealers, or franchisees, and the basis for damages 
is lost profits. I 3 Damages based on lost profits seem quite consistent 
with the statutory language of section 4, mandating damages based on 
the plaintiff's losses. In fact, lost profits were historically the preferred 
measure of damages. I 4 However, in most cases there is absolutely no 
useful correlation between the amount of the antitrust plaintiff's lost 
profits and the profitability of the antitrust violation to the 
defendant. Is 
1. Optimal Damages for Overcharge Injuries 
a. Naked price fixing or monopolization. The simplest example of 
an overcharge case is the monopolist or cartel member charging its 
short-run profit-maximizing price. Figure One illustrates this situa-
10. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1986). 
11. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
13. See Salop & White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 
1005-06 (1986). 
14. It took a Supreme Court decision before overcharge damages even became an acceptable 
alternative to lost profits. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 
396 (1906); see also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 788 (1977); Harri-
son, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REV. 751, 
760 (1980). 
15. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
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tion. In perfect competition, a firm would set the price of its product 
equal to the marginal cost of producing it, or Pc, and output would be 
Qc. The monopolist or cartel, however, will reduce output to the point 
that marginal cost equals marginal revenue, or Qm, and price will rise 
correspondingly to Pm. Rectangle 2-3-5-4 represents the subsequent 
transfer of wealth from consumers to the monopolist. Triangle 4-5-6 
represents the traditional "deadweight loss" from monopoly - re-
sources that are lost because they are denied to consumers but do not 
show up as gains to the monopolist either.16 If the demand curve is 
linear, as shown in Figure One, triangle 4-5-6 will be exactly half as 
big as rectangle 2-3-5-4.17 Assuming a wealth transfer of $100 caused 
by this monopoly, the deadweight loss will be $50. If the demand 
curve is not linear, the deadweight loss triangle may be greater than or 
less than half the wealth transfer. 18 
One might think that the optimum penalty for antitrust violations 
must be based on the deadweight loss, since that loss represents the 
"social cost" of monopoly. But clearly a penalty equal to the dead-
weight loss would be too small. The conduct represented in Figure 
One is inefficient from society's standpoint because it produces a dead-
weight loss of $50 with no offsetting efficiencies. It generates $100 in 
profits to the violator. A fine of $50 would not deter the conduct, for 
the defendants could pay the fine and still have $50 profit left over. 
Importantly, a fine equal to the deadweight loss does not in any way 
"reverse" the social cost of the cartel. By the time the cartel members 
are caught, those resources have been wasted and cannot practicably 
be recovered. The purpose of the fine is not to "restore" or recover the 
lost efficiency, but merely to prevent such losses from occurring in the 
future; the aim of the penalty is not compensation, but deterrence. 
If the expected profitability of this monopoly or cartel is rectangle 
2-3-5-4 with no offsetting social benefits, the optimal penalty should be 
slightly larger than the area described by 2-3-5-4. That is, the wealth 
transfer determines the optimal penalty. If the antitrust violation is 
secret, such as a bid-rigging or naked price-fixing agreement, then the 
16. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at §§ 1.2-.3; E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: 
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 293-95 (5th ed. 1985). 
17. It can be shown that the slope of the marginal revenue curve (MR) is twice the slope of 
the demand curve (DJ if the demand curve is linear. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 16, at 131-33. 
As a result, line 3-5 is the same length as line 5-6. Thus, 4-5-6 is a triangle with the same base 
and height as rectangle 2-3-5-4. Since the area of a triangle equals one-half the base times the 
height (l/2BH), triangle 4-5-6 is exactly half the size of rectangle 2-3-5-4. 
18. J. ROBINSON, THE EcONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 144 (1934). In general, if 
the demand curve is concave (as viewed from the top down), the deadweight loss triangle will be 
smaller than one half of the wealth transfer. If the demand curve is convex, the deadweight loss 
triangle will be larger than one half of the wealth transfer. 





damages must be increased by a multiplier to account for the 
probability that it will go undetected. 19 Treble damages, which Clay-
ton Act section 4 currently requires, is the correct multiplier only if we 
can assume that the probability of detection is one in three.20 Thus, if 
a cartel member anticipates profits of $100 from the cartel and calcu-
lates a one in three chance it will be caught, a fine of marginally 
greater than $300 should be sufficient to deter the conduct. 
b. Violations with offsetting efficiencies. Computing the optimal 
penalty becomes more complex if an antitrust violation also produces 
offsetting efficiencies. Mergers often fall into this category, as do joint 
ventures and single-firm monopolization. If enforcement tribunals 
had perfect information, they would be able to balance the social gains 
19. See Landes, supra note 2, at 654; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 95. 
20. For the rationality of this assumption, see Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform, 33 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 233, 251-57 (1988). 
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of such activities against the losses and condemn only those that were, 
on balance, inefficient. But they do not have such information, so they 
generally look for threats to competition and - if such threats are 
found - ignore claimed offsetting efficiencies, unless the case for them 
is very strong. The 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines take 
this position. 21 
It is possible to levy a fine or damage award sufficiently large to 
deter inefficient violations, but not large enough to deter efficient ones. 
Figure Two illustrates this principle. It shows a market containing 
two firms which, if they behaved competitively, would each set price 
equal to Pc. Their total output would be Qc. If the two firms joined 
through a merger or joint venture, however, two things would happen. 
First, the firms would collectively acquire the power to monopolize the 
market; second, they would reduce their costs of production or distri-
bution by achieving economies of scale or scope. Accordingly, the 
firms will set a price determined by the intersection of the marginal 
cost and marginal revenue curves, rather than the intersection of the 
marginal cost and demand curves; however, their marginal cost curve 
will be lowered from C2 to CJ. Output will be Qm and price will be 
Pm. In the illustration Qm is less than Qc, and Pm is greater than Pc, 
but this will not always be the case. If the amount of market power 
created by the merger or joint venture is relatively small and the cost 
savings are relatively large, the new "monopoly" price might actually 
be lower than the old "competitive" price.22 Furthermore, the net effi-
ciency of the merger or joint venture will not depend on whether the 
resulting price is higher or lower than the older price. The merger 
might facilitate a price increase but nevertheless produce efficiency 
gains, which accrue to the firm in the form of higher profits and out-
weigh the losses in allocative efficiency. 
An optimal damages rule would not be concerned with whether 
the price following the joint venture was higher or lower,23 but rather 
with whether the gains in productive efficiency outweighed the losses 
in allocative efficiency. The way to sanction only those joint ventures 
in which the productive efficiency gains do not outweigh allocative effi-
21. 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,831, 26,834 (1984); see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTI· 
TRUST LAW~~ 939', 940' (Supp. 1989). 
22. Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, Afterword: Could a Merger Lead to Both a Mo11opoly a11d a 
Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983). 
23. Although it would be concerned in one sense: if the resulting price were lower there 
would be no consumer injury as a result of the violation, and thus no private cause of action by 
consumers. A competitor injured by a post-merger firm's lower prices would not have a cause of 
action, for it would not be a victim of "antitrust injury" unless the prices were predatory. See 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 21, at ~~ 340.2d-.2e. 





ciency losses is to set damages as the sum of the wealth transfer and 
the traditional deadweight loss. 
For example, suppose that a merger like the one illustrated in Fig-
ure Two yielded a traditional deadweight loss of $100 (triangle 5-7-9) 
and a wealth transfer of $200 (rectangle 2-4-7-5), but at the same time 
produced a cost savings of $90 (rectangle 3-4-7-6). Damages set as the 
sum of the wealth transfer and the deadweight loss would be $300. In 
this case, the firms would not pursue the merger, because its profita-
bility (wealth transfer plus cost savings) would be only $290. Like-
wise, in this case the merger would be socially inefficient: its 
deadweight loss of $100 would be weighed against its cost savings of 
$90, and the wealth transfer of $200 would appear on both sides of the 
equation and would therefore be a wash. The calculation shows a net 
social loss of $10. 
But suppose that the cost savings were $125 rather than $90. A 
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penalty of $300 would not deter the merger, because its value to the 
merging firms would now be $325. Likewise, the merger would be 
efficient overall because the cost savings would be greater by $25 than 
the traditional deadweight loss. In short, an optimal damages rule fix-
ing damages as the sum of the wealth transfer and the dead weight loss 
would make inefficient mergers unprofitable but leave efficient ones 
profitable. 
Whether damages equal to the sum of the wealth transfer and 
traditional deadweight loss are "optimal" in cases of efficiency-
creating mergers is a matter of some dispute, even within the Chicago 
School. The alternative position is that there should be an efficiency 
"defense" in merger cases - i.e., if a merger yields higher prices but 
produces gains in productive efficiency that exceed any losses in allo-
cative efficiency, damages should be set at zero.24 
The choice between the optimal damages rule and the efficiency 
defense rule depends largely on how naive a model one uses for analy-
sis. Both rules would deter inefficient mergers. The efficiency defense 
rule - zero damages for efficient mergers - would make efficient 
mergers more profitable than the rule awarding damages equal to the 
wealth transfer plus deadweight loss. Under perfect information, both 
rules should permit the creation of all efficient mergers, for any 
amount of net profitability would encourage the merger. As soon as a 
little indeterminacy is thrown in, however, it seems clear that the effi-
ciency defense rule would facilitate more mergers than the "optimal'' 
damages rule. Drawing on the above example, suppose that a firm in a 
position to merge calculates that the proposed merger would yield a 
traditional deadweight loss of,$100, a wealth transfer of $200, and a 
cost savings of $125. Under the optimal damages rule, this merger is 
worth $25 (wealth transfer plus cost savings, less the sum of wealth 
transfer and deadweight loss). Under the efficiency defense rule, the 
merger is worth $325 (wealth transfer plus cost savings; no damages). 
But suppose in addition that the firm calculates there is a fifty percent 
chance that the court will miscalculate the deadweight loss as $150 
rather than $100. In this case, the expected value of the merger under 
the optimal damages rule. is zero;25 its expected value under the effi-
ciency defense rule is $150.26 In the presence of uncertainty, the effi-
24. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX ch.10 (1978); Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE w. RES. L. REV. 381, 392 n.41 (1980). 
25. Expected damages (wealth transfer plus dead weight loss) are now $325, since there is a 
50% chance that the court will measure the deadweight loss as $100 and a 50% chance that it 
will measure the deadweight loss as $150. 
26. That is, if the court calculates the deadweight loss correctly, the value of the merger will 
be $325, as noted previously. If the court miscalculates the deadweight loss as $150, the firm will 
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ciency defense rule would permit relatively more mergers. 
The rule that optimal damages equals the sum of the wealth trans-
fer plus the traditional deadweight loss applies to both naked and effi-
ciency-creating antitrust violations. In the case of naked violations, 
such as bid-rigging, overdeterrence is not much of a problem because, 
almost by definition, there is little likelihood of offsetting efficiencies, 
and any expected penalty greater than the monopoly gains will deter 
the conduct. But if the conduct produces any efficiencies, the potential 
defendants will be obliged to compare the efficiency-creating potential 
with the deadweight loss. They will then pursue the conduct only if 
the efficiency-creating potential is greater. 
2. Optimal Damages for Competitor Injuries 
The difference between the Optimal Deterrence Model and the 
current regime of private antitrust enforcement is much greater when 
the plaintiff is a competitor or potential competitor of the violator, as 
is true in the great majority of antitrust cases.27 In such cases the 
plaintiff's damages are based on lost profits or sometimes lost invest-
ment.28 However, these profits or investments are not transferred to 
the monopolist or cartel as monopoly overcharges. They are lost 
resources that result from the defendant's exclusionary practices, not 
from its monopoly pricing. 
In the case of consumer lawsuits, monopoly overcharges and mo-
nopoly profits are rough "mirror images,"29 so the consumer who 
recovers the statutory damages "by him sustained" is also depriving 
the monopolist of monopoly profits. But, as a general rule, the 
amount of money that an excluded rival loses as the result of a monop-
oly, and the amount that the monopolist gains, bear little relationship 
to one another. 
The Optimal Deterrence Model is not concerned with compensa-
tion for victims, but rather with deterrence of violators. The proper 
measure of deterrence is the same whether the plaintiff is a consumer 
or a competitor: damages should equal the sum of the overcharge 
from any monopoly created by the antitrust violation and the tradi-
lose its efficiency defense and have to pay $350 in damages, against cost savings of $325, for a net 
loss of $25. Since the likelihood of this is .5, the expected value of the merger is [325 + (-25)] /2, 
or $150. 
27. See Salop & White, supra note 13, at 1005 n.25, 1005-06, Table 5; see also Easterbrook, 
supra note 2, at 95; Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365 
(1970). 
28. See infra section IV.C. 
29. Total consumer injury and monopoly profit are not identical, however. Consumer injury 
is greater by the amount of the traditional deadweight loss. 
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tional deadweight loss. This rule would permit efficient exclusionary 
practices to continue while stopping inefficient ones. 
Once again, one may wish to dispute whether the Optimal Deter-
rence Model really yields "optimal" damages at all. A strong case can 
be made that optimal damages for efficient exclusionary practices are 
zero damages. Competition is by nature exclusionary, and we do not 
want to penalize companies for engaging in efficient competition.30 In 
fact, the law of monopolization, much more than the law of mergers, 
recognizes such an "efficiency defense." As a general rule, unilateral 
practices by a dominant firm that reduce its costs or give it a better 
product are legal, even if the practices permit the firm to charge a 
price well above its marginal cost and injure competitors in the pro-
cess. For example, successful innovation produces both monopoly 
profits and competitor injuries, but we do not penalize innovation with 
a fine equal to the wealth transfer plus the deadweight loss. The gen-
eral antitrust rule is that innovation is legal, regardless of the amount 
of monopoly profits it produces or the extent to which it injures com-
petitors. The penalty is zero. 3 t 
Nonetheless, in a world of perfect information, a rule setting 
damages for exclusionary practices as the sum of the monopoly wealth 
transfer and traditional deadweight loss would deter inefficient exclu-
sionary practices while permitting efficient ones. 
II. THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE MODEL AND THE SOCIAL COST 
OF MONOPOLY 
The Optimal Deterrence Model is built on the theory that the ex-
clusive goal of antitrust policy should be the pursuit of economic effi-
ciency. Since efficiency consists of two parts, allocative efficiency and 
productive efficiency, which must sometimes be traded off against each 
other, the goal has been expressed in various ways. Most generally, 
the stated goal is that antitrust policy should seek to maximize alloca-
tive efficiency while doing as little harm as possible to productive effi-
30. One can suggest counterexamples. Suppose an unregulated ambulance company bribes a 
city council to deny a license to a potential competitor. As a result, the company is able to use its 
ambulances more frequently, and its average fixed costs are reduced. The practice is inefficient 
only if the welfare losses created by the perpetuation of the monopoly exceed the cost savings 
that result from more efficient use of equipment. Nevertheless, we may wish to penalize this 
conduct whether or not it is efficient, simply because we do not want monopolies to be created in 
this way. 
31. See, e.g., California Computer Prods. Co. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1093 (1980); see also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at~ 718'; Sidak, Debunking 
Predatory Innovation, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1983). 
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ciency.32 Alternatively, one might argue that an antitrust policy 
whose goal is to maximize social welfare would try to minimize the 
sum of losses caused by allocative inefficiency and productive ineffi-
ciency. 33 The Optimal Deterrence Model precisely addresses this al-
ternative statement of the goal: it makes monopoly-creating conduct 
unprofitable only if allocative efficiency losses exceed productive effi-
ciency gains. 
But no matter how this principle is defined, it clearly depends on 
some concept of the social cost of monopoly, which is the principal 
factor in determining allocative inefficiency. Other things being equal, 
the higher the social cost of monopoly in an unregulated market, the 
more intervention will be appropriate. The Optimal Deterrence 
Model compares the social cost of any monopoly created by an anti-
trust violation with the social value of any productive efficiency that 
might result from that violation. 
Our notion of what ingredients must be included in the "social 
cost" of monopoly has changed over the last thirty-five years.34 As a 
result, our ideas about the size of the social cost of monopoly have 
changed accordingly. Sections II.A and II.B briefly summarize the 
development of theory concerning the social cost of monopoly. Sec-
tion II.C then argues that the current measures of social cost under-
state the true social cost of monopoly, perhaps by a very wide margin. 
Later, I will make some suggestions about the implications of this 
broader conception of the social cost of monopoly for antitrust policy. 
A. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Method I 
The orthodox determination of the social cost of monopoly is illus-
trated by the simple diagram in Figure Three, which depicts demand, 
price, and output under competitive and monopoly conditions. If the 
market represented by Figure Three is competitive, price will be rela-
tively low, at Pc, and output will be relatively high, at Qc. If the mar-
ket falls to the control of a monopolist, however, output will drop to 
Qm, and price will rise accordingly to Pm. 
A loss in allocative efficiency consists of value that is taken away 
from one individual or group but not given to someone else. It simply 
32. In Robert Bork's words: "The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to 
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce 
either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." R. BORK, supra note 24, at 91. 
33. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 18 (1968). 
34. The modern debate over the nature and relative size of the welfare loss caused by monop-
oly began with the publication of Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 66 AM. EcoN. 
A. PAPERS & PROC. 77, 86 (1953). 




vanishes, because, like a iost opportunity, it has been wasted. The "so-
cial cost," or allocative efficiency loss, illustrated in Figure Three is 
traditionally represented by triangle 4-5-6, the "deadweight" loss tri-
angle. This triangle describes wealth that is taken away from consum-
ers but which is not given to the monopolist, because the monopolist 
makes no profits on output it does not produce. This triangle is desig-
nated "WLJ,, in Figure Three, for it represents the first discovered 
element of welfare loss from monopoly. 
Rectangle 2-3-5-4 in Figure Three consists of wealth that is taken 
away from consumers and transferred to the monopolist in the form of 
higher prices {{Pm - Pc)Qm). Traditionally, neoclassical economists 
were very careful to distinguish the deadweight loss of monopoly from 
the mere wealth transfer. When wealth is merely transferred, society 
as a whole is neither better nor worse off. Society is injured collec-
tively only when wealth is destroyed, or lost. For those who believe 
th~t efficiency is the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws, the wealth 
transfer is not a policy problem, for it represents no efficiency loss.35 
For them, the antitrust problem is the deadweight loss triangle. 
This perspective on the social cost of monopoly is important, even 
if in practice one cannot distinguish the "deadweight loss" from the 
35. Consider, for example, the comment of Robert Bork: "(C]ourts should ignore income 
distribution in deciding antitrust cases .... " R. BORK, supra note 24, at 112. Or see economist 
Arnold C. Harberger's statement that what monopoly "does through its effect on income distri· 
bution I leave to my more metaphysically inclined colleagues to decide." Harberger, supra note 
34, at 87. 
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wealth transfer. Our notion of what ingredients are included in the 
social cost of monopoly tells us something about the amount of inter-
vention in the market that is appropriate. If we think the social cost of 
monopoly is small, a tiny amount of intervention or perhaps even no 
intervention at all is in order. Since intervention is itself a costly com-
modity - operating the intervening system is costly, as are any errors 
that might result - we might well conclude that the cost of any inter-
vention is likely to be greater than the cost of the monopoly thus de-
stroyed. Society would be better off if we did not intervene at all. 
Using the definition given above, several economists have argued 
since the 1950s that the social cost of monopoly is quite small.36 A 
few have disagreed.37 What these studies share, however, is their re-
gard for the difference between price and marginal cost, or, more pre-
cisely, the difference between actual output and output when price 
equals marginal cost, as the principal factor in determining the social 
cost of monopoly. 
B. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Method II 
In an important essay published in 1967, Gordon Tullock argued 
that any attempt to assess the social cost of monopoly must acknowl-
edge the widespread existence of "rent seeking" in society.38 A mo-
36. Harberger, supra note 34, at 86 (social cost may be as little as one-tenth of one percent of 
national income); Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. EcoN. 627, 629-30 (1960) 
(social cost of monopoly is less than $234 million per annum); see also Goldberg, Welfare Loss 
and Monopoly: The Unmaking of an Estimate, 16 EcoN. INQUIRY 310, 311 (1978) (arguing that 
others have overstated the social cost of monopoly); Goldberg, A Note on the Costs of Monopoly, 
17 ANTITRUST BULL. 479, 482 (1982) (same). 
37. See Comanor & Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q.J. EcoN. 177 
(1975) (social cost of pricing above marginal cost is large); Hall, The Relation Between Price and 
Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL. EcoN. 921 (1988) (same); Kamerschen, An Estimation 
of the "Welfare Losses" from Monopoly in the American Economy, 4 W. ECON. J. 221, 235 (1966) 
(concluding that the social cost of monopoly may be as high as six percent of national wealth); 
Stigler, The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 33, 34-35 (1956) (arguing that 
Harberger and others understated the social cost of monopoly). 
38. Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. EcoN. J. 224 (1967). 
Other important contributions to this argument include Krueger, The Political Economy of the 
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974), and Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly 
and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 807 (1975). The argument's predecessor is Plant, The Eco-
nomic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 EcoNOMICA 30 (New Ser. 1934). In addition, 
much of the "social choice" literature of the mid-1980s dwells on the inefficiencies that attend 
lobbying and other forms of"rent seeking." See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249-
63, 317-64, 491-507 (3d ed. 1986); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: 
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45-58 (1984); Farber & Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TE~AS L. REV. 873 (1987). 
For criticism of the rent seeking theory as applied to merger cases, see Muris, supra note 25, 
at 381, 392 n.41, and Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. 
REV. 699, 713-23 (1977). Muris and Williamson do not object to the theory, but rather to any 
broad application of it in merger policy. They argue that, since the increase in market power that 
results from a marginally legal merger is small, firms will not spend vast amounts in rent seeking 
in order to merge. 
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nopoly is valuable to its owner. People who have monopolies will be 
willing to spend a certain part of their resources in order to maintain 
or enlarge them. Likewise, people who do not have monopolies will be 
willing to spend resources in an effort to acquire them. Some of these 
expenditures may result in social benefits. For example, our patent 
system is based on the premise that research and development is so-
cially valuable, and ought to be rewarded with a finite period of mo-
nopoly profits. 39 
But a good deal of rent seeking is inefficient. The taxicab company 
that petitions or perhaps bribes the city council for an airport monop-
oly, the dominant firm that uses patent fraud to exclude rivals, the 
cartel that goes to great lengths to make sure that its members do not 
cheat it through secret price concessions - all of these firms spend at 
least part of their anticipated monopoly returns in the enterprise of 
creating or retaining the monopoly itself. At the margin, rectangle 
2-3-5-4, identified in Figure Three as a mere wealth transfer, is not a 
wealth transfer at all, but a wasted resource: money inefficiently spent 
by the monopolist or aspiring monopolist intent on retaining or attain-
ing a monopoly position. In Figure Three, rectangle 2-3-5-4 is desig-
nated "WL2, " for it constitutes a second element of welfare loss, or 
loss in allocative efficiency, caused by monopoly. 
A few observations about this second method for estimating the 
social cost of monopoly are in order: 
1. Under Method II, the social cost of monopoly is larger than 
under Method I, for Method II includes the entire deadweight loss 
triangle (WLJ) plus the sum of any resources inefficiently spent by the 
firm in attaining or retaining its monopoly position (at least part of 
WL2 ). How much larger the cost is when calculated under Method II 
instead of Method I is difficult to say. As noted earlier, ifthe demand 
curve is linear, rectangle 2-3-5-4 is precisely twice as big as triangle 4-
5-6. 40 If a firm in such a market should spend its entire anticipated 
monopoly overcharge inefficiently in attaining its monopoly, the allo-
cative efficiency loss caused by monopoly as measured under Method 
II would be precisely three times the loss as measured by Method I. 
This might happen if there were perfect competition in the "market" 
for a particular monopoly, where a firm would invest in prospective 
monopoly up to the point that investment equalled the anticipated 
39. See Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal. 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 
(1984). 
40. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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retum.41 
But in the real world demand curves are not linear. Further, not 
all the resources spent by the monopolist in attaining or retaining its 
position are spent inefficiently. For example, while innovation is a 
form of "rent seeking" in that a firm does it in order to earn monopoly 
profits, most innovation is efficient. Depending on the shape of the 
demand curve, the social cost of monopoly as measured by Method II 
could be either less than or greater than three times the traditional 
deadweight loss. 
2. Although measuring the social cost of monopoly under 
Method I is very difficult, it is still more difficult to measure under 
Method II. Measuring the social cost of monopoly under Method I 
requires information about marginal cost at the competitive rate of 
output,42 current prices, and the shape of the demand curve.43 Of 
these three elements, only current price is easy to obtain; the other 
two, marginal cost at the competitive rate of output and the shape of 
the demand curve, can perhaps be estimated with some difficulty. 
Measuring the social cost of monopoly under Method II requires 
all of the information used in Method I plus information about the 
strategic, or rent-seeking, behavior of firms. We need to know not 
only how much the firm spends in attempting to attain or retain mo-
nopoly power, but also how much of this money is being spent effi-
ciently and how much inefficiently. Such determinations raise 
difficulties of a different magnitude than those under Method I. For 
example, they involve such perplexing questions as whether advertis-
ing, product differentiation, or innovation are ever anticompetitive 
and, if so, how to disaggregate the cost of efficient advertising from 
inefficient advertising. These problems are almost certainly intractable 
by any methodology known today. 
C. The Social Cost of Monopoly: Method III 
Figure Three illustrates the two elements of the social cost of mo-
nopoly described to this point, WLJ and WL2, as well as a rectangle, 
not part of the demand curve or its cost and revenue functions, called 
"WL3. " Even the sum of WLJ and WL2 understates the social cost of 
41. For example, if firms bid against each other for an exclusive monopoly franchise, the bid 
price can be expected to approach the present value of anticipated monopoly returns. 
42. Because marginal cost is not necessarily constant, but may rise as output increases, mar-
ginal cost at the current, or monopoly, output is often the wrong figure. 
43. Most models relate marginal cost to current price, or simply look at rates of return as a 
surrogate for the relationship between marginal cost and price. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 37, at 
921-22; Harberger, supra note 34, at 77. 
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the kind of monopoly with which the antitrust laws are concerned. 
The missing element of the social cost of monopoly, WL3, is drawn 
away from the demand curve because WL3 is not captured by the de-
mand curve itself. Its definition, existence, or size is not clearly related 
to any of the cost or revenue functions ordinarily included in the de-
mand curve. 
Exclusionary practices, or rent seeking, by the monopolist gener-
ally impose costs on the monopolist itself. The costs can be diagram-
med, for their outer limit is determined by the wealth transfer, which 
is itself a function of the demand curve and the monopolist's marginal 
cost curve. A firm will not spend more in acquiring or maintaining a 
monopoly than the value of the monopoly. Thus the outer boundaries 
of monopoly rent seeking are determined by the potential wealth 
transfer (WL2). 
But monopoly rent seeking also imposes inefficient losses on com-
petitors, or perhaps others, and these losses are potentially unlimited. 
They can certainly be substantially larger than either the traditional 
deadweight loss (WLJ) or the loss that results from rent seeking 
(WL2). To take an extreme example, suppose that the world market 
contains two aircraft manufacturers, each of which owns a single 
plant. The chief executive officer of one of the firms creates a monop-
oly by visiting the other firm's plant one night with a can of gasoline 
and a match, and burning it down. In this case, WLJ is indeterminate; 
WL2 is the cost of the match, the gasoline, the opportunity cost of the 
CEO's time, and the risk and expected consequences of getting caught. 
At the very least, WL3 is the cost of the destroyed plant, inventory, 
and perhaps goodwill, of retraining employees whose jobs have been 
lost, and of reliance interests lost by broken contracts. 44 
What is the size of WL3 in real-world monopolization or cartel 
cases? Generalizing is difficult, but it could be substantial.45 Con-
44. For example, if a supplier has invested heavily in a contractual commitment to supply the 
victim firm with some input, that investment may now be lost if it cannot be redeployed. 
45. One might argue that in a world without transaction costs WL3 can never be greater 
than the net wealth transfer {the wealth transfer rectangle less the resources spent in acquiring 
the monopoly), for if it were, competitors would pay the monopolist in order to be free of the 
exclusionacy practice. For example, if the monopoly that is created when the CEO torches a 
competitor's plant has a net value to the monopolist of $1000, but the destroyed plant costs the 
competitor $5000, the competitor will pay the aspiring monopolist something between $1000 to 
$5000 not to destroy its plant. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I {1960). 
The possibility of this transaction actually occurring is decreased by several factors. Most 
important, it is illegal to destroy a competitor's plant. The aspiring monopolist would have to 
make a credible threat that it could destroy the plant without leaving evidence sufficient for 
conviction, and the threat itself would have to be unprovable in court. Further, the aspiring 
monopolist would have to make some kind of credible commitment that, once the bribe was paid, 
it would not make the same threat again and again and again. 
If the aspiring monopolist were caught, its damages under the antitrust Jaws would be at least 
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sider, for example, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Allied Tube 
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 46 The plaintiff, Indian Head, 
had developed a plastic electrical conduit that threatened substantial 
injury to the market for traditional steel conduit. Defendant Allied, a 
manufacturer of steel conduit, conspired with others to "pack" a meet-
ing of a standard-setting organization, with the result that approval of 
the plastic conduit was successfully delayed for several years. Because 
government building codes generally incorporated the standard-setting 
organization's standards verbatim, the effect was that the plaintiff's 
plastic conduit could not be used in most construction. 
In Indian Head, WLJ is the deadweight loss caused by any mo-
nopoly perpetuated by Allied's conduct.47 WL2 is wealth transferred 
from consumers to Allied and its co-conspirators, discounted by the 
costs of packing the meeting and campaigning for disapproval of the 
plastic conduit, and the risk of a lawsuit and its costs. WL3 is the lost 
investment suffered by Indian Head in research and development of a 
product that now has no market, or whose introduction into the mar-
ket has been delayed. If Allied had succeeded in delaying the market-
ing of plastic conduit indefinitely, Indian Head's entire investment in 
researching and developing a socially valuable product would have 
been lost. 
Most bona fide monopolization cases produce more than trivial 
amounts of WL3 loss. Often the amount of WL3 loss will be propor-
tional to the plausibility of the basic offense. For example, monopo-
lizing conduct is most likely to succeed in markets where assets are 
specialized, durable, and costly, because new entry into such markets 
can be deterred most easily. These markets are said to be subject to 
high barriers to entry.48 WL3 loss is also likely to be larger in such 
markets, because it is more likely that investment in production facili-
$15,000 (lost investment plus lost profits, trebled). The intended victim might prefer to lie in 
wait and catch the CEO in the act, after the plant has been destroyed in order to benefit from the 
trebled damages. 
WL3 losses might also include practices that raise the marginal costs of rivals, thus causing 
deadweight losses in secondary markets. See Salop & Scheirman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 95 AM. 
EcoN. A. PAPERS & PROC. 267 (1982); Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE 
L.J. 109, 117 n.42 (1985). 
46. 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988). A similar case is American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs. v. 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
47. Actually, the Indian Head situation may be a little more complex. Presumably, the de-
mand curve for conduit would shift to the right in response to the introduction of Indian Head's 
product. The result of the conspiracy was to delay this shift, yielding a deadweight loss analo-
gous to that caused by monopolization of a market in which no technological change is 
occurring. 
48. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW~ 409 (1978); P. AREEDA & H. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at~~ 711.2d, 917.1. -
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ties or research and development cannot be recovered in the event of 
failure. In short, under this method for calculating the social cost of 
monopoly, monopolization is the biggest threat in situations where 
WL3 loss is likely to be highest.49 
D. The Optimal Deterrence Model Reconsidered 
Consider the firm that excludes its rival by engaging in patent 
fraud, 50 or the colluding joint venture that uses a boycott to deprive a 
disruptive competitor of an essential input.51 Suppose that the activity 
creates or perpetuates a monopoly that results in a traditional dead-
weight loss of $100 and a wealth transfer of $200. The activity may or 
may not produce some compensating cost reductions but, for the sake 
of argument, assume cost reductions of $125. If damages are mea-
sured by the Optimal Deterrence Model, the violators will pursue their 
activity because it promises a profit of $325 and a fine of only $300. 
But suppose in addition that the activity forces the competitor to 
exit from the market, requiring the closure of a specialized plant or the 
loss of expenditures on research and development or advertising equal 
to $35. In that case, the activity is inefficient; yet, the Optimal Deter-
rence Model would permit the activity, despite this inefficiency, for the 
Model neglects to take WL3 losses into account. 
E. Antitrust Injury 
One possible defense of the Optimal Deterrence Model is that WL3 
losses are not really a social cost of monopoly as such, but rather the 
social cost of harmful conduct generally. For example, arson imposes 
a social cost when property is destroyed and we condemn arson for 
that reason alone, without regard to its potential for creating a monop-
oly. We should not use the antitrust laws to condemn arson, this argu-
ment goes, even though arson is socially costly. The antitrust laws 
should be used only to condemn monopoly. 
49. One important exception to this is strategic entry deterrence, or exclusionary conduct 
directed at potential, rather than actual, competitors. Potential competitors may be deterred 
easily precisely because they have not yet made irreversible investments in a market. WL3 losses 
in such situations are accordingly smaller. See P. AREEDA & H. HoVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 
1] 340.2j; Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 91 AM. EcoN. A. 335 (1978); Williamson, Predatory 
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 {1977). 
50. For example, by suing or threatening to sue on patents that it knows to be invalid. See 3 
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 48, 1] 708; P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, 
at 1] 708'. 
51. A disruptive competitor is one who refuses to go along with the express or tacit collusion 
of others. See United States Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 3.44(c), 49 Fed. Reg. 
26,823, 26,833 (1984). For the general problem of joint ventures' exclusion of competitors, see 
United States Department of Justice, International Operations Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 24 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) § 3.42 (Supp. Nov. 10, 1988). 
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The response to this argument is that although arson is not gener-
ally an antitrust problem, it can become one when it is used by a firm 
in order to create a monopoly or when it naturally has the effect of 
creating a monopoly. Further, not all activities that result in WL3 
losses are illegal under some independent body of law. The relevant 
question for antitrust policy is not whether conduct is independently 
illegal, but whether it is anticompetitive and calculated to create or 
maintain a monopoly. The so-called Brunswick, or "antitrust injury," 
doctrine addresses these concerns. 52 In order to prevail, the Sherman 
Act plaintiff must show first that the challenged conduct was anti-
competitive - i.e., calculated to create a monopoly. Second, the 
plaintiff must show that it suffered an injury of the type that the anti-
trust laws were intended to condemn, and which "flow[ ed] from that 
which makes the defendants' acts unlawful" under the antitrust 
laws. 53 The fact that an efficient plant was forced to close or that a 
potentially successful product was kept off the market is part of the 
social cost of monopoly only if the person responsible did it in order to 
attain or retain a monopoly position. In that case, the victim has been 
injured by the kind of activity that the antitrust laws were designed to 
protect against. A properly constructed Optimal Deterrence Model 
must consider all the social costs of monopoly, or it will underdeter. 54 
Ill. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
The legislative history of the antitrust laws makes clear that inju-
ries caused by monopoly were prominent in the minds of the Sherman 
Act's framers. While the economic concepts of allocative efficiency 
and social cost were unknown to them, 55 some members of Congress 
realized that monopoly yielded both high prices and reduced output. 
Some were concerned about the injuries that powerful firms might 
52. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); see also Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 21, at ff 334.2. 
53. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
54. As Landes formulates the Optimal Deterrence Model, the optimal fine "should equal the 
net harm to persons other than the offender." However, Landes neglects to take WL3 losses into 
account. See Landes, supra note 2, at 656. · 
55. The geometric illustration of monopoly is attributable chiefly to Alfred Marshall, whose 
Principles of Economies was first published in 1890. Marshall relied on Augustin Cournot's 
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth originally published in 1838 
(English ed. 1929). See A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIES 493-94, 820 (8th ed. 1938); 
Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. EcoN. 1 (1957). Cournot's 
book was generally not accessible in the United States in the nineteenth century. The modern 
notion of the "social cost" of monopoly and the welfare loss triangle is really a product of the 
welfare economics of the 1920s. See Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of 
Competition, 75 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1989). 
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visit upon their smaller competitors. At the same time, many were 
also concerned that successful firms not be condemned as illegal mo-
nopolists merely because they were somehow superior to their rivals.56 
In 1966, Robert Bork attempted to show that Congress' dominant 
concern in passing the Sherman Act was allocative efficiency, neoclas-
sically defined.57 According to Bork, wealth transfers from consumers 
to dominant firms were really not all that important as far as the Con-
gress of 1890 was concerned. Neither was it concerned about injury to 
competitors. Congress' principal concern, Bork argued, was that mo-
nopoly would lower output and force consumers to make inefficient 
substitutions for the monopolized product. 58 
But Bork's analysis of the legislative history was strained, heavily 
governed by his own ideological agenda. He concluded all too quickly 
that because some members of Congress knew that demand curves 
slope downward (Le., that output is reduced as prices rise),59 that they 
also had a modern conception of allocative efficiency and the social 
cost of monopoly. Not a single statement in the legislative history 
comes close to stating the conclusions that Bork drew. 60 
In 1982, Robert Lande looked at the same legislative history - in 
fact, at many of the same statements that Bork had highlighted - and 
concluded that Congress' primary concern was not allocative effi-
ciency, but rather wealth transfers away from consumers and to the 
monopolist. 61 The difference between Bork's and Lande's conclusions 
is important. For example, under Bork's analysis an efficiency-
creating agreement among competitors, or even a horizontal merger 
that actually results in higher prices, should be legal if the gains to the 
56. See infra note 64. 
57. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) 
[hereinafter Bork, Legislative Intent]. Bork made the same argument, although in less detail, in 
R. BORK, supra note 24, at chs. 1 & 2. 
58. See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 57, at 47. 
59. See 21 CONG. REC. 2462 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting that contracts that 
increase prices also "diminish the amount of commerce"); see also 21 CONG. REC. 2558 (1890) 
(statement of Sen. Pugh) (noting that the aim of trusts is "to limit the production of articles .•• 
for the purpose of destroying competition in production and thereby increasing prices to consum-
ers"); 21 CONG. REC. 4101 (1890) (statement of Rep. Heard) ("[T]he very object of these giant 
schemes of combined capital is not to increase the volume of supply, and thus lessen the cost of 
any useful commodity, but rather to repress, reduce, and control the volume of every article that 
they touch, so that the cost to consumers is increased while the expenditure for production is 
lessened, and thereby their profit secured."). 
60. About the best Bork could come up with" were a few statements that combinations whose 
impact is merely to reduce the costs of production should not be condemned. See Bork, Legisla-
tive Intent, supra note 57, at 26-31. 
61. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi· 
ciency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 150 (1982) [hereinafter Lande, Wealth 
Transfers]; see also Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 449 (1988). 
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participants are greater than the losses to the consumers and so long as 
no one else is affected. Under Lande's analysis, however, such merg-
ers or joint ventures should be illegal, because Congress was more con-
cerned about the transfer of wealth away from consumers than it was 
about efficiency as such. 
My own reading of the legislative history of the Sherman Act sug-
gests the following: 
(1) The members of Congress in general, and particularly Sena-
tor John Sherman, wanted to preserve something they called "compe-
tition." Although "competition" was never defined formally, most of 
the speakers appeared to use it to mean "rivalry," or the presence of 
multiple sellers in a market. Never once was "competition" defined as 
a state of affairs in which price equals marginal cost, or any other 
measure of cost. That is not surprising, since in 1890 the conception 
of "competition" as a state of affairs in which price equals marginal 
cost was not yet formulated in the economic literature. 62 
(2) Several members of Congress understood that high prices and 
lower output went hand-in-hand - that is, that demand curves slope 
downward. 63 
(3) Most members of Congress who spoke on the question be-
lieved that combinations should not be condemned if their only effect 
was to lower the costs of production. 64 
( 4) The members of Congress who spoke on the question believed 
that combinations that lowered the costs of production but that also 
decreased output or increased prices should be condemned65 - herein 
lies the difference between Bork and Lande. 
(5) Nearly every member of Congress who spoke on the issue 
suggested that consumer lawsuits would be ineffectual because individ-
ual consumer injuries were too small; further, everyone agreed that 
62. See Hovenkamp, supra note 55. However, the basic concept of marginal cost, unlike the 
modem concept of allocative efficiency, was known in the economics literature by 1890. E.g., A. 
MARSHALL, supra note 55, at 151-75; see generally Howey, The Origins of Marginalism, in THE 
MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN EcONOMICS 15 (R. Black, A. Coats & C. Goodwin eds. 1973). The 
term "marginal cost" never appears in the legislative history of the Sherman Act. How Congress 
could have been thinking of allocative efficiency without mentioning marginal cost, Bork fails to 
tell us. 
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
64. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (The bill "does not in the 
least affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition." Senator 
Sherman also praised corporations to the extent that they "lessen the cost of production."); see 
also 21 CONG. REC. 3151-52 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (arguing that section 2 would not 
condemn a corporation that acquired the "whole business" merely because it was the best 
competitor). 
65. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
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competitors should be entitled to sue. 66 
(6) Although the drafters of the Sherman Act were concerned 
about injury to consumers, they were at least as concerned with vari-
ous kinds of injury to competitors. 67 
On point (4) - the heart of the dispute between Bork and Lande 
- Lande clearly appears to have the better supported argument. Sen-
ator Sherman's own view was that a combination that resulted in 
higher prices to consumers would not be exempt even though it re-
duced production costs as well: 
It is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to 
the consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows 
that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer. The price to 
the consumer depends upon the supply, which can be reduced at plea-
sure by the combination. It will vary in time and place by the extent of 
competition, and when that ceases it will depend upon the urgency of the 
demand for the article. 68 
A. The Efficacy of Consumer Lawsuits 
On point (5), several members of Congress questioned consumer 
lawsuits as antitrust enforcement devices. To the extent that the Sher-
man Act purported to enact the common law of trade restraints, there 
was good reason for such doubts. The common law generally denied 
consumer damages actions for overcharge injuries. 69 As a general 
matter, cartels were unenforceable at common law; yet neither were 
they challengeable by third parties such as consumers. Boycotts could 
be challenged by nonparticipants, but the challengers were almost al-
ways competitors. 10 
Further, the Congressmen who spoke to the issue of consumer law-
suits were generally doubtful about their efficacy. For example, Sena-
tor James Z. George of Mississippi objected that individual consumers 
would suffer a very small injury: 
It is manifest that in nearly every instance the damage by the advanced 
66. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
67. For the concerns for consumer or competitor welfare expressed by the framers of the 
Sherman Act, see the Appendix to this Article infra. 
68. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890). Although the Senate at one point adopted an amendment 
that would have exempted combinations that lessened production costs (provided that they did 
not do so by lowering wages) without regard to where the profits went, see id. at 2654-5S, this 
language did not survive to the final bill as it came out of the conference committee. See id. at 
6208, 6312. 
69. See Hovenkamp, supra note SS. 
70. Id. One important exception was an employer's challenge to labor strikes. Courts fre-
quently treated labor strikes as boycotts and permitted employers to bring actions as consumers 
of labor. The remedy in such cases was ordinarily an injunction. See Hovenkamp, Labor Con-
spiracies in American Law, 1880-1930. 66 TEXAS L. REV. 919 (1988). 
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price of each article affected by these combinations would be - though 
in the aggregate large, indeed - so small as not to justify the expense 
and trouble of a suit in a distant court. The consumer claims a loss of, 
say, $25, on a particular article, as sugar, affected by the combination. If 
he succeeds he gets double damages;71 that is, $50. He may live in Mis-
souri, or Texas, or Kansas; he must go to New York, or Boston, or Chi-
cago, or some distant city to bring his suit. He is poor, a farmer, or 
mechanic, or laborer. He undertakes to get damages from a powerful 
and rich corporation, or combination of corporations and persons. . . . 
I do not hesitate to say that few, if any, of such suits will ever be 
instituted, and not one will ever be successful. 72 
Senator George later attempted to remedy this situation with an 
amendment that would have permitted a type of plaintiff class action 
in which liability would be determined as to a large group of plaintiffs 
but damages would be assessed to each individually.73 The amend-
ment was rejected, 74 despite Senator George's protests that consumer 
injuries would be too small to warrant bringing suits individually.75 
Senator Frank Hiscock of New York likewise noted that the con-
sumers of trust articles were often located in different states than the 
trust itself, that their particular injuries were small, and that lawsuits 
would require travel. Furthermore, the plaintiffs would almost cer-
tainly have to be final consumers, for the "middlemen will never com-
mence these actions" since they are not the ultimate ;victims. 76 
In one dialogue involving Senator Sherman, Senator John T. Mor-
gan of Alabama described two different abuses by trusts. The first 
abuse involved exclusionary, predatory practices by the cottonseed-oil 
trust against a competitor. 77 The second abuse involved injuries to 
consumers caused by monopoly price increases. 78 With respect to the 
71. Senator Sherman's amended bill provided for double damages. S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 2 (1890) (as reported by the Senate Committee on Finance on Jan. 14, 1890). The bill that 
eventually came out of the Judiciary Committee contained a treble damages provision. S. 1, 51st 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 21 CONG. REC. 3145 (1890). 
72. 21 CONG. REC. 1768 (1890). 
73. Id. at 3148. The amendment would have permitted 
any number of persons complaining of such injuries committed by the same defendant 
against each of them separately, to join as plaintitfs, and the court or jury trying the issues of 
fact in any such cause shall find the amount of the separate damages sustained by each 
plaintitf and may also find in favor of a part of said plaintitrs and against the others, as the 
proof shall warrant. 
Id.; see also id. at 3150 (statement of Sen. George). 
74. Id. at 3148. 
75. Id. at 3147-48. 
76. Id. at 2571. 
77. Id. at 2609. 
78. Id. at 2610. See also the comments by Senator Richard Coke, attacking the private rem-
edy provision as a "wasp without a sting" with respect to consumers who paid higher prices. Id. 
at 2615. And see the comments by Senator Teller of Colorado, criticizing t~e bill's private 
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second, Senator Morgan noted the problem of tracing the product to 
the wrongdoer, particularly where the product was a fungible com-
modity, such as sugar. Senator Morgan noted that double damages 
would not be available unless the consumer could "identify the sugar, 
or the molasses, or whatever it is, and run it back to the manufacturer 
or to the refiner and prove the conspiracy. "79 
Senator Sherman responded to Senator Morgan by observing that 
the competitor injured by the cottonseed-oil trust's predatory practices 
could sue under his bill. He made no response to Senator Morgan's 
difficulties with consumer actions and the problem of tracing 
damages.80 
Senator Sherman himself paid little attention to the question of 
private enforcement, preferring to emphasize the power of the United 
States government to bring suit. 81 Importantly, no one defended the 
efficacy of consumer lawsuits. 
On the other hand, no one doubted that competitor lawsuits would 
work. Everyone who spoke about them believed that competitors 
should be freely permitted to enforce the antitrust laws. Senator Sher-
man himself spoke of the "humble man" who dares to start a business 
"in opposition to" a giant trust, such as Standard Oil. He knew of 
such men, he said, and his bill was meant to give them a right to sue. 82 
Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, who was more responsible 
than Senator Sherman for the final language of the Sherman Act, 83 
defended the monopolizing prohibition of section 2 entirely in terms of 
injury to competitors. Section 2 was necessary, Hoar argued, because 
section 1 required a combination, while section 2 referred to the uni-
lateral "engrossing to a man's self by means which prevent other men 
from engaging in fair competition with him."84 Senator George F. 
Edmunds of Vermont agreed, citing the Webster's Dictionary defini-
tion of "to monopolize" not as obtaining power to raise price or re-
duce output, but rather "[t]o purchase or obtain possession of the 
whole of ... with the view to appropriate or control the exclusive 
sale."85 
remedy provision because the damages caused to consumers were "inconsequential individually, 
but great to the whole mass of people." Id. at 2571. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., id. at 2461. 
82. Id. at 2569. 
83. See H. THORELL!, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 210-14 (1955); Letwin, Congress 
and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REV. 221, 254-55 (1956). 
84. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890). 
85. Id. 
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Thus, built into the legislative history was a concept roughly akin 
to the "antitrµst injury" requirement of today:86 only conduct calcu-
lated to create a monopoly is to be condemned. However, competi-
tors, at least as much as consumers, are to be considered among 
antitrust's protected classes. 
Of course, private antitrust actions today are governed by sections 
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, which was passed in 1914, 87 and not by 
the Sherman Act. However, those sections of the Clayton Act were 
passed with almost no legislative discussion. Their purpose was to ex-
tend the power of private enforcement to all the federal antitrust laws, 
including both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 88 In substance, 
section 4 of the Clayton Act is otherwise identical to its predecessor, 
section 7 of the Sherman Act. 89 Although the debate surrounding pas-
sage of the Clayton Act is voluminous, it contains virtually no discus-
sion of the respective merits of consumer or competitor lawsuits. 
B. The Significance of Congressional Concern About Monopoly 
Prices 
My point (6) is that Congress was as concerned about injury to 
competitors as injury to consumers. Judge Easterbrook has argued 
that when Senator Sherman and his colleagues "protested the sugar 
trust and other malefactors," their principal concern was high con-
sumer prices.90 "However you slice the legislative history," he con-
cludes, "the dominant theme is the protection of consumers from 
overcharges .... The few references in the legislative history to 'small 
dealers' are a sideshow."91 
The legislative history of the Sherman Act contains ample refer-
ence to both high consumer prices and injury to competitors. But a 
good deal of external history suggests that Judge Easterbrook has the 
sideshow and the main event reversed. 
86. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
87. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1986) (private treble damage actions); 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1986) (private 
injunctive relief). 
88. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. l, at 14 (1914) (purpose of then§ 5, now 
§ 4, of the proposed Clayton Act was to supplement § 7 of the Sherman Act by creating a 
damages action for violation of "any of the antitrust laws"). 
89. Section 7 of the Sherman Act provides: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corpora-
tion by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor 
in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is 
found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890). 
90. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1702-03 (1986). 
91. Id. at 1703 {footnote omitted). 
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Much of the wrath of the Sherman Act's framers was directed at 
the sugar trust and at Standard Oil Company of Ohio, then facing a 
forced dissolution and reorganization under the corporate law of New 
Jersey.92 Were the real complaints about the sugar trust and Standard 
Oil directed at their high prices? Hardly. From 1880 through 1890, 
the price of refined petroleum in the United States fell by sixty-one 
percent, by far the largest decrease in a decade of generally decreasing 
prices, and there was over the same period an almost four-fold in-
crease in output.93 The Standard Oil Company was responsible for 
much of this,94 and some members of Congress knew it.9S George 
Gunton, a contemporary economist and observer, noted in 1888 that 
between 1871 and 1887 the price of crude fell from 10.52 cents per 
gallon to 1.59 cents, and the price of refined oil from 24.24 cents per 
gallon to 6.75 cents.96 Gunton's figures also showed that the amount 
added to the price by the refining process itself fell from 13. 72 cents 
per gallon in 1871 to 5.16 cents per gallon in 1887.97 Whatever the 
cause for Congress' complaint about Standard Oil, it was not high 
consumer prices, not during the twenty-year period prior to the Sher-
man Act's passage. 
The sugar trust, Congress' other big target98 and the subject of the 
Supreme Court's first Sherman Act decision in 1895,99 showed the 
same kind of performance, although the price decreases were not as 
dramatic. The price of sugar fell by more than eighteen percent be-
tween 1880 and 1889, and would fall another twenty-eight percent be-
tween 1890 and 1900, the decade during which the United States 
brought its antitrust action against the sugar trust. 100 The iron and 
92. The court in State v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 49 Oh. St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892), forced 
Standard Oil Company to divest most of its assets. Standard Oil Company responded by ex· 
panding and reorganizing under a preexisting corporate structure in New Jersey. J. JENKS & W. 
CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM 347-48 (1929 & reprint 1973). 
93. See L. TELSER, supra note 5, at 27. 
94. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 
(1958). 
95. See infra notes 124, 140 and accompanying text. 
96. Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspect of Trusts, 3 PoL. Sci. Q. 385, 394 (1888). 
97. Id.; see also J. JENKS & W. CLARK, supra note 92, at 108, Chart V (showing steadily 
decreasing prices from 1880 to approximately the beginning of the first world war, even as Stan· 
dard Oil was acquiring its dominant position); E. VON HALLE, TRUSTS, OR INDUSTRIAL COMDI· 
NATIONS AND COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 72-74 (1900) (same). Von Halie's well-
known book generally identifies the primary evils of the trusts as price cutting and granting 
rebates, the effect of which was to injure competitors. Id. at 79-91. 
98. In part, because of the decision in People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 
582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890). . 
99. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see L. TERSER, supra note S, at 28. 
100. L. TELSER, supra note 5, at 28-29; see also J. JENKS & W. CLARK, supra note 92, at 82, 
Chart I (showing steadily decreasing prices from 1880 to 1900). 
October 1989) l'rotecte<i <::lasses 29 
steel industry, another target of the Sherman Act's proponents, had 
experienced price declines of twenty-one percent. 101 Across the board, 
the prices of manufactured goods declined during the 1880s,102 and 
even the railroad cartels appeared not to be working very well. 103 Fur-
thermore, Congress was not at all clear about whether it even intended 
railroads to be covered by the Sherman Act, given that the Interstate 
Commerce Act had been passed three years earlier. A Supreme Court 
decision in 1897 first established that railroads were covered by the 
Sherman Act. 104 
One might suggest that although prices in fact fell during the 
1880s, the common belief was that prices were rising and Congress 
was responding to this perception. But that does not seem to be the 
case either. Most of the contemporary evidence established without 
controversy that prices were indeed falling, a fact that contemporary 
economists readily confirmed.105 In fact, "ruinous competition" was 
perceived to be a much bigger threat than high prices. 106 
So to posit that Congress' principal concern in enacting the Sher-
man Act was high consumer prices is to suggest that Congress was 
dealing with a problem that did not exist. To be sure, economists had 
already developed a predatory pricing theory that dominant firms 
might use temporary periods of low pricing in order to drive out com-
petitors and charge higher prices later. 107 But as of 1890 the trusts 
had not succeeded in doing this. The principal victims of the trust 
movement of the 1880s - certainly of the trusts that appeared most 
frequently on Congress' hit list - were inefficient small firms, rather 
than consumers. Competitors were the principal protected class of the 
Sherman Act. 
101. L. TEI.SER, supra note 6, at 28. 
102. Id. at 12, 27. 
103. Id. at 30-31; see also T. Ulen, Cartels and Regulations: Late Nineteenth Century Rail-
road Collusion and the Creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission 224 (unpub. Ph.D. 
diss. Stanford Univ. 1979). 
104. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
105. See, e.g., J. JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1900); Clark, The Limits of Competition, in 
THE MODERN DISTRIBUTIVE PROCESS 11 (J. Clark & F. Giddings eds. 1888); Gunton, supra 
note 96, at 390-94; Jenks, The Michigan Salt Assn., 3 POL. SCI. Q. 78 (1888); Jenks, The Whiskey 
Trust, 4 POL. SCI. Q. 296 (1889). 
Even Brown University's Elisha Andrews, one of the most vehement critics of the trusts, 
conceded that Standard Oil's prices had declined through the 1870s and 1880s. Andrews argued 
that the rate of decline slowed somewhat after the trust was formed. Further, he argued, Stan-
dard Oil made its money by limiting production in order to maintain competitive prices. An-
drews, Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117, 144-46 (1889). 
106. See Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 
TEXAS L. REV. 105 (forthcoming 1989). 
107. See, e.g., w. COLLIER, THE TRUSTS: WHAT CAN WE Do WITH THEM? WHAT CAN 
THEY Do FOR Us? 123-24 (1900). 
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There is no evidence of any organized consumer lobbying for the 
Sherman Act. The principal constituencies of some of the Sherman 
Act's congressional supporters were owners of small businesses. 108 
For example, Senator Sherman was from Ohio, a state that witnessed 
dramatic declines in the price of refined petroleum products. Senator 
Sherman was not speaking for consumers of refined petroleum prod-
ucts, but rather for the small producers and refiners whom Standard 
Oil had driven to ruin. 
IV. ANTITRUST'S PROTECTED CLASSES AND PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. Who Should Be Permitted To Enforce the Antitrust Laws? 
Under the Optimal Deterrence Model, the identity of the person 
with the cause of action is not all that important, provided the poten-
tial plaintiff has the correct incentives. The incentives are not past 
injury done, but the prospect of recovery. The entire cause of action 
for the wealth transfer plus the deadweight loss could be given to con-
sumers, to competitors, or, for that matter, to all of the country's iden-
tical twins, and the effect would be the same. If suit were profitable, 
these classes of people would sue. 
But section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that only people who 
have been injured by antitrust violations may sue for damages, and 
that their damages are to be measured by their injury. Article III of 
the United States Constitution probably also requires that only people 
injured by antitrust violations be allowed to sue for damages. 109 
As a rough approximation, giving consumers a damages action for 
overcharge injuries and competitors a damages action for WL3 losses 
would appear to satisfy the statutory mandate, although it might be 
underdeterrent insofar as it fails to include damages based on the 
traditional deadweight loss caused by monopoly. Ironically, even 
though the traditional deadweight loss triangle is the oldest recognized 
and least controversial of monopoly's social costs, the existing rules of 
antitrust standing rarely permit the deadweight loss to become the ba-
108. This is further borne out by the fact that three months later Congress enacted the Mc· 
Kinley Tariff, one of the most repressive and inflationary in American history, in order to protect 
American business from foreign competition. See L. TELSER, supra note 5, at 21. 
109. See America West Airlines v. Burnley, 838 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (plaintiff who 
could not show injury caused by defendant's conduct denied constitutional standing; court did 
not need to reach the issue of Clayton Act standing). But see County of Oakland v. City of 
Detroit, 866 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1989) (direct purchaser who successfully passed on entire 
monopoly overcharge to its own customers might have constitutional standing in spite of the 
absence of any injury in fact). On the injury of such direct purchasers, see Hovenkamp, The 
Indirect Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1990). 
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sis of a damages action. The immediate burden of the traditional so-
cial cost of monopoly is borne by consumers who would have 
purchased the product at a competitive price, but who refuse to buy at 
the monopoly price. The efficiency loss results from the fact that these 
consumers must make a substitute choice that gives them a lower con-
sumer surplus than the surplus they would have enjoyed had the mar-
ket been competitive. 
But the courts have not been kind to damages actions by 
nonpurchasers - people who claim that they would have purchased 
at the competitive price but responded to the monopoly price by buy-
ing something else. 110 Under traditional standing doctrine, the judi-
cial skepticism has generally been warranted. In order to prove 
damages, a nonpurchaser must show (1) that it would have purchased 
the monopolized product at the competitive price; (2) how much it 
would have purchased; and (3) the amount by which its consumer's 
surplus was reduced as a result of the substitute purchase.111 Often 
the first and almost always the second of these involves a great deal of 
speculation - more than attends the computation of an actual pur-
chaser's overcharge injuries. 
Given the existence of WL3 injury, there is little to justify a rule 
denying a damages action to competitors, provided that the damages 
are measured properly. 112 In fact, competitors are often the most effi-
cient enforcers of the antitrust laws, for they are in a position to catch 
monopolistic activity much earlier than are consumers. 
B. Antitrust's Early Warning System 
Of the three kinds of welfare loss caused by monopoly, WLJ - the 
traditional deadweight loss caused by inefficient consumer substitution 
110. See, e.g., Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982). Most of the cases have involved those claiming that they bought 
not from the cartel, but from an alternative supplier at a higher price. See, e.g., Mid-West Paper 
Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 583-87 (3d Cir. 1979). A few courts have 
granted standing under such circumstances. See, e.g., In re Beeflndus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 
1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Safeway Stores v. Meat Price Investigators Assn., 
449 U.S. 905 (1980). Some plaintiffs have convinced courts to grant standing on the theory that 
the plaintiff was the victim of a "boycott" - i.e., that in order to carry out its output reduction, 
the cartel effectively agreed not to deal with a particular class of customers. See, e.g., Amey v. 
Gulf Abstract & Title, 758 F.2d 1486 (1 lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986). 
111. For example, suppose that widgets at the competitive price yield a consumers' surplus of 
$20, but widgets at the cartel price would yield a consumer's surplus of $10. Buyer responds to 
the cartel, however, by purchasing gidgets, which yield a consumer's surplus of $16. As a rough 
approximation, Buyer's injury is the number of gidgets it purchased multiplied by $4 - the 
amount of lost consumers' surplus on each unit. But Buyer probably purchased fewer gidgets 
than it would have purchased widgets at the competitive price. In any event, computing the 
various amounts of consumers' surplus could be a monumentally complex task. 
112. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
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- is often the last to appear. WLJ losses generally show up only after 
the monopolist has succeeded in reducing output and raising price. 
However, both WL2 and WL3 losses occur while the monopolist or 
aspiring monopolist is taking the anticompetitive actions that it hopes 
will create or protect its monopoly. 113 
This suggests that the argument of some that private damage ac-
. tions in antitrust cases should be given only to the victims of monop-
oly overcharges114 amounts to shutting the barn door long after the 
horse has disappeared. Even an antitrust policy concerned exclusively 
with economic efficiency would wish to minimize the sum of WLJ + 
WL2 + WL3. Since the sum of WL2 and WL3 can be far larger than 
WLJ, an enforcement policy that recognizes only the victims of WLJ 
as members of antitrust's protected class is much too little, very much 
too late. 
The welfare losses in WL2 offer a deterrence of sorts to monopoly, 
since the losses fall on the monopolist itself. As a result, a firm will 
not spend money in creating monopoly if the expected return is less 
than its costs. But, for the same reason, WL2 losses create no 
victims. 115 
WL3 losses are a different matter. These losses fall most fre-
quently on the monopolist's competitors or potential competitors, 
although occasionally the victim may be a vertically related firm. For 
example, the first victims of predatory pricing are a firm's competitors. 
Consumers are the last. The same is true of most exclusionary prac-
tices, such as anticompetitive standard setting, 116 patent fraud, and the 
113. This is true even of the firm that already has monopoly power and is using an exclusion· 
ary practice to protect its position. In that case the deadweight (WLI) loss of the conduct is the 
market's failure to correct itself in the future. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 108 
S. Ct. 1931 (1988), is, once again, a good example. Assuming that Allied already had a steel 
conduit monopoly (or was in a cartel with others), the WL2 losses (resources expended in pack· 
ing the standard-setting meeting and compromising its deliberations) and WL3 losses (lost re· 
search investment to Indian Head) occur almost immediately. WLI losses are the result of the 
fact that the future market will contain only steel conduit in an amount controlled by Allied and 
its fellow cartel members, rather than steel conduit plus plastic conduit. 
Sometimes WLI losses appear roughly simultaneously with WL2 and WL3 losses. For exam· 
pie, an action that raises a rival's marginal cost may immediately give the actor the power to 
increase price while imposing WL3 losses on a rival. See Salop & Scheffman, supra note 45, at 
268. 
114. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 
331 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies]; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 96. 
115. One exception is the price-regulated firm entitled to pass WL2 costs on to consumers. 
For example, a gas or electric utility company might engage in expensive exclusionary practices 
designed to deter rivals - such as building plants with large amounts of excess capacity - and 
then pass the costs on to customers. In that case, the monopoly "overcharge" would account for 
both WLI losses and WL2 losses. 
116. See the discussion of the Indian Head and Hydro/eve/ cases, supra notes 46-47 and ac· 
companying text. 
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like. The fact that WL3 losses are among the first to be experienced 
suggests that allowing damages actions by victims of WL3 losses can 
reduce or eliminate WLJ losses, reduce WL3 losses, and even reduce 
WL21osses. 
The Optimal Deterrence Model is concerned with deterrence, not 
with compensation. It might be objected that if the amount of deter-
rence is set properly, one need not worry about whether enforcement 
comes early or late. Why not wait until the monopoly is created, and 
then permit consumers to sue for WLJ losses and competitors for 
WL3 losses? If our deterrence system were perfect, there would be no 
inefficient antitrust violations under either enforcement system. 
The answer is that our deterrence system is not perfect. As long as 
there is any indeterminacy or imperfection in our system of detecting 
and prosecuting antitrust violations - that is, as long as some people 
have reason to believe they can violate the antitrust laws and get away 
with it - violations will occur. An Optimal Deterrence Model that 
recognizes this fact must also be concerned with minimizing the social 
costs of those antitrust violations that will be attempted. In that case, 
a system that permits the first person injured by the violation to sue is 
more efficient than a system that requires the legal system to suspend 
enforcement until the last person has .been injured. The competitor 
lawsuit may illumine the way for others, who may then tag along on 
the competitor's knowledge. In such circumstances, a little consumer 
free-riding would not be a bad thing. But such a system will work 
only if both competitor and consumer have sufficient incentives to 
sue. 117 
1. The Fake Problem of False Positives in Competitor Lawsuits 
The most strongly stated objection to expansive use of competitor 
lawsuits in antitrust cases is that competitors can be injured by a dom-
inant firm's superior efficiency or competitive prowe~s just as much as 
by its anticompetitive exclusionary practices. Furthermore, antitrust 
litigation does not discriminate very accurately between efficient and 
inefficient conduct that harms rivals. But we can be more confident 
that conduct is monopolistic when it actually eventuates in a monop-
oly.118 Thus, for example, Judge Easterbrook believes that only con-
117. The evidence suggests that consumers are quite likely to sue in the wake of prior deter-
minations of guilt in government or earlier private suits. Whether the willingness to sue results 
from increased knowledge of the violation or from the effects of offensive collateral estoppel, 
which can greatly reduce the costs of suit, is difficult to assess. See P. AREEDA & H. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at~~ 323', 323.1-323.2; Salop & White, supra note 13. 
118. See, e.g., Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
972 (1986). 
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sumers should be permitted damages actions for predatory pricing. 
When they complain, it will be of monopoly. The competitor is likely 
to complain about the efficient price cut of a superior rival just as 
much as the predatory price cut of an equally efficient one. The court, 
given its poor measurement capabilities, is likely to identify the com-
petitive price as predatory.119 
The possibility of false positives in antitrust cases generally must 
be conceded. But any argument that relies on the possibility of false 
positives to eliminate or limit competitor lawsuits must answer two 
questions. First, is the problem of false positives so substantial that it 
warrants throwing out competitor lawsuits altogether - particularly 
if competitors are able to catch incipient monopolization in its early 
stages? Second, does the problem go away when consumers rather 
than competitors bring the lawsuits? If it does not go away, then the 
first question is also answered: there is no reason for discriminating in 
favor of consumers and against competitors. 
The logic of Judge Easterbrook's argument rests on the premise 
that courts can more easily recognize illegal monopoly after it has oc-
curred than while it is being created; since we cannot be sure that what 
a competitor alleges to be predatory pricing is really so, we should 
wait until after the monopoly is created, and permit consumers to sue. 
But this assumes that, once monopoly has allegedly been created, 
we will be in a better position to judge, first, whether a monopoly has 
really been created, and second, whether the conduct that created it 
was competitive or anticompetitive. Efficient as well as inefficient con-
duct can force rivals from a market. For example, monopolies can be 
created either by anticompetitive predation or by the efficient price 
cutting of a firm that has simply achieved lower costs than its rivals. 
There is no reason to believe that predatory pricing will be easier 
to recognize in a later lawsuit by consumers (after rivals have been 
driven from the market and prices raised) than in an earlier lawsuit by 
competitors. Indeed, information is more likely to be current at the 
time of the competitor injury. Furthermore, the competitor or com-
petitors, whose individual losses are relatively large, have incentives to 
sue that consumers often lack. 12° Finally, both competitive pricing by 
a more efficient firm and predatory pricing can produce monopoly. 
Granted that monopoly has been created, how will the court in the 
consumer lawsuit determine whether it has been created illegally? 
119. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note 114. 
120. Individual consumers will not likely have experienced the kind of dramatic impact on 
their well-being that would have inspired a competitor to sue. Indeed, consumers may never 
even realize that they were victims of a successful predation scheme. 
October 1989] l'rotecte<i C:lasses 35 
Presumably, it will have to make some "guesstimate" by using the 
Areeda-Turner average variable cost test or some alternative, just as it 
would do in a competitor lawsuit.121 
Consumer lawsuits are brought only after it seems that predation 
has succeeded. Competitor lawsuits may be brought after one or two 
periods of price cutting in which some but not all rivals have been 
forced from the market. At this stage, one cannot be certain that the 
predation will succeed - although one can certainly look for signals 
suggesting that predation cannot succeed, such as the absence of sig-
nificant entry barriers or the generally competitive structure of the 
market. In such cases, the complaint should be dismissed. But deny-
ing a competitor a damages action merely because no monopoly has 
yet been created will enlarge, rather than diminish, the social cost of 
monopoly. 
If competitors in the first suit are just as good at proving anti-
competitive exclusionary practices as consumers in the later suit, but 
are in a better position to minimize the social cost of the monopoly at 
hand, then a competitor lawsuit is a more efficient enforcement device 
than a consumer suit. 
2. The Vexing Problem of Failed Attempts 
One of the most perplexing questions in the economics-antitrust 
literature is whether failed attempts - conduct intended to create a 
monopoly but that fails to do so - should be the subject of private 
plaintiff damages actions. The courts generally recognize such ac-
tions, 122 although they are more skeptical about the basic antitrust 
claim if the defendant was clearly unsuccessful in attaining market 
power.123 
Under the strict neoclassical model, the social cost of a failed at-
tempt to create a monopoly is zero. The social cost of a monopoly is 
the deadweight loss triangle (WLI), which comes into existence only 
when a firm or group of firms with monopoly power reduces output 
121. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 48, at ch. 7C. The one opportunity for a 
false positive presented by the competitor lawsuit for predatory pricing, but not by the consumer 
suit, is the failed attempt. See infra section V.B.2. If an attempt to create a monopoly through 
predation fails, its only victims will be competitors driven from the market or forced to incur 
losses during the price war. Since no monopoly is created, consumers will enjoy a period of low 
prices which later will be restored to the competitive level. 
122. See, e.g., Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1007 (1985); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 993 (1964). 
123. See, e.g., Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 841 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
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and raises price. In the case of the failed attempt, this never happens; 
there will be no output reduction and no welfare loss. Since enforce-
ment is costly, the wealth-maximizing rule with respect to failed at-
tempts may be a rule of no liability. 
This same rule probably applies if our notion of the social cost of 
monopoly is expanded to account for WL2 losses as well as those in 
the deadweight loss triangle (WLJ). In this case, the failed attempt to 
create a monopoly will result in a social cost - namely, the resources 
spent by the aspiring monopolist in its attempt. However, in this case 
the conduct is self-deterring: the aspiring monopolist itself bears the 
full social cost of its conduct. Since it is the only "victim" of the failed 
attempt, no externally imposed sanction is necessary. The advocates 
of the Optimal Deterrence Model generally argue that failed attempts 
should go unpunished.124 
To be sure, this argument has some weaknesses - principally, it 
seems to overlook the fact that, according to the Optimal Deterrence 
Model, general deterrence is the goal of antitrust policy. The fact that 
the social cost of a particular failed attempt is zero should not be par-
ticularly important. What is important to a deterrence-based enforce-
ment scheme is how the intending violator feels ex ante about his 
plans, and ex ante it may not be clear whether an attempt to monopo-
lize will succeed or fail. The point of deterrence-based antitrust policy 
is to discourage people from committing anticompetitive practices in 
the first place, and that decision must be made at a time when the 
prospect of success is less than one-hundred percent. 
But more importantly, once the full social cost of monopoly -
including WL3 losses - is taken into account, the self-deterring na-
ture of failed attempts is no longer clear. First of all, failed attempts 
can impose large social costs. The aspiring monopolist may underesti-
mate the tenacity or solvency of its rival. It may overestimate the ex-
tent of entry barriers in the market. It may misjudge the relevant 
market altogether and face massive consumer defections in response to 
its price increase. 125 As a result, its attempt to create a monopoly will 
fail, but the attempt itself can impose enormous losses on rivals who 
must spend resources defending themselves or make costly exits from 
the market in favor of other firms. 
124. See, e.g .. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 101 (monopoly overcharge is the proper basis for 
damages); Landes, supra note 2, at 656 ("[T]he fine should equal the net harm to persons other 
than the offender."). 
125. For example, if a manufacturer of widgets should drive the only other widget manufac-
turer out of the market through predatory pricing, but the relevant market actually includes 
widgets plus gidgets, its later price increase will yield nothing but defections from widgets to 
gidgets. 
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As a basic premise, a firm will not undertake a costly attempt to 
monopolize unless it has made some kind of calculation that the at-
tempt will likely succeed. That is, ex ante, the profitability of the mo-
nopoly discounted by the probability of failure or the likelihood of 
detection and suit makes the conduct appear profitable. Ex post, the 
guess turns out to be wrong. In such cases, recognizing a cause of 
action for failed attempts increases the cost of making them. 
Once again, there may be a problem of false positives. 126 Courts 
may be more likely to identify conduct wrongly as anticompetitive 
when a firm fails to create a monopoly than when it succeeds. But this 
proposition is not self-evident and has never been proved. Just as both 
competitive and anticompetitive conduct can create monopolies, both 
competitive and anticompetitive conduct can fail. In some cases, of 
course, monopoly in a given market was never plausible to begin with, 
and the failed attempt is simply further evidence of that fact. But in 
the relevant range - where conduct, measured ex ante, could reason-
ably be predicted to yield a monopoly - there is no reason to believe 
that courts will be better at determining whether successful conduct 
was anticompetitive than they are at determining whether unsuccess-
ful conduct was anticompetitive. This suggests that courts should not 
dismiss a complaint simply because a particular practice failed to pro-
duce a monopoly, but should instead take very seriously questions 
about the plausibility of monopoly in a particular market. 
C. Damage Measurement for WL3 Losses 
Clayton Act section 4 provides that the victim of an antitrust vio-
lation may "recover threefold the damages by him sustained."127 The 
statute makes no distinction between purely private losses (such as 
those that might result from a wealth transfer) and private losses that 
coincide with losses to society in general. Congress knew little or 
nothing of such distinctions, either in 1890 when it passed section 4's 
predecessor, section 7 of the Sherman Act, 128 or in 1914, when it en-
acted the Clayton Act itself. 
Not all the losses suffered by competitors in antitrust cases reflect 
net welfare losses. More importantly, not all the claimed losses are 
real losses at all. While competitor damage actions for antitrust viola-
tions should continue to be permitted, the basis for damages should be 
126. See supra note 121. 
127. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 35 Stat. 730, 
731 (1914)). 
128. Sherman Act, § 7, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 
283, 69 Stat. 283). 
38 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1 
reexamined in order better to account for the societal costs of antitrust 
violations. 
1. Loss of Investment 
The clearest case for competitor damage recovery is the competi-
tor's net loss of investment - i.e., investment in research and develop-
ment or in manufacturing or distribution facilities that have been 
wasted and cannot be recovered as a result of an antitrust violation. 
The Indian Head case129 is a good illustration. Suppose that a com-
petitor develops at great expense a superior technology. The dominant 
firm in the industry, seeing that the new technology threatens its mar-
ket position and profits, manages to convince a standard-setting asso-
ciation or government regulator to close the market to the innovator's 
technology. The innovator suffers (a) the loss of its investment in de-
veloping the technology; and (b) the loss of whatever profits the new 
technology would have yielded during the period that the market re-
mains closed. Ordinarily a court would not want to award both of 
these losses to the plaintiff-innovator, for they are cumulative. That is, 
if the technology had been marketed as planned, the plaintiff's gross 
profits would have been reduced by costs, including its investment in 
research and development. To award the plaintiff both its lost invest-
ment and its lost profits would effectively treat it as if it had no costs, 
giving it more than it would have gotten absent the antitrust violation. 
In such cases, a firm that can establish its lost profits in a convincing 
way should be able to recover only those lost profits, before trebling; a 
firm that cannot establish its lost profits should be able to recover only 
its lost investment, before trebling. 
2. Lost Profits Generally 
Competitor claims for lost profits often provide opportunities for 
excessive damage awards. As noted above, an award for both lost in-
vestment and lost profits would represent double-counting. Forced to 
choose between a recovery based on lost profits or lost investment, 
there may well be reason to prefer the latter. Loss of investment will 
almost always be easier to calculate. In most antitrust cases where lost 
profits are used as a basis for damages, the experts engage in the 
rankest speculation. For example, under the "yardstick" method 
sometimes used to estimate lost profits the plaintiff is permitted to 
identify a different firm, often in a different location, that is presumed 
129. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988); see supra 
notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
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to be like the plaintiff's firm in as many respects as possible but for the 
antitrust violation. The plaintiff then argues that this "yardstick" 
firm's profit-and-loss statement is what the plaintiff's profit-and-lost 
statement would have looked like but for the defendant's actions. Of 
course, in many businesses some firms do very well and others do very 
badly for reasons unrelated to the antitrust laws, and there may be a 
great deal of dispute over a suitable "yardstick." More importantly, 
however, the determinants of firm profitability are both stochastic, or 
somewhat random, and extremely complex.130 There are no two iden-
tical firms in two different cities. Even two McDonald's franchises in 
identical buildings and traffic areas, and with equally capable manage-
ment, can show widely different rates of profitability. Assuming that 
one firm's profits will reflect the damages suffered by a distant victim 
of an antitrust violation is, therefore, distinctly problematic.131 The 
"before-and-after" method, which attempts to reconstruct lost profits 
during the violation period by comparing the plaintiff's profits before 
the violation began and after it ended, poses similar diffi.culties. 132 
Equally speculative is the "market share" method, which attempts to 
determine what the plaintiff's market share would have been had the 
plaintiff not been victimized by the defendant's antitrust violation.133 
130. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
145·50 (2d ed. 1980). 
131. See, e.g., Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 
1987) (rejecting a particular "yardstick" as too speculative). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), which originally approved the "yardstick" method. On the 
yardstick method generally, see E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST AC-
TIONS ch. 21 (1965); Goetz, The Basic Rules of Antitrust Damages, 49 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 125 
(1980); Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plain-
tiffs, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (1976); Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damages 
Actions, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 497 (1972). 
132. See Graphic Prods. Distrib. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983): 
Proof of the diminution in the going concern value of a business is ascertainable by compar-
ing the fair market value of the business before and after the antitrust violation. Testimony 
of business appraisal experts as to what a hypothetical willing buyer would pay a hypotheti-
cal willing seller on the open market would be one method of establishing loss in going 
concern value. 
717 F.2d at 1580 n.37 (citation omitted). The going concern value of a business is generally a 
function of its anticipated profitability. 
133. As described by one recent court, the market share theory "involves an estimation of 
the market share the plaintiff would have had but for the defendant's unlawful conduct. Based 
on the market size and an estimate of plaintiff's likely profit margin, the total profits the plaintiff 
would have earned if the estimated market share had been achieved are determined." Consoli-
dated Gas Co. of Fla. v. City Gas Co. of Fla., 665 F. Supp. 1493, 1543-44 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In 
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Assn., 830 F.2d 716, 726 (7th Cir. 1987), the 
court relied on an accountant's projection of the market share that the plaintiff would have 
achieved had it not been subjected to illegal restrictions. The accountant did this by comparing 
market shares of Avis dealers in unrestricted markets (where the defendant Avis owned the 
dealerships) and those in the plaintiff's markets, which were subject to the restrictions. See also 
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (ap-
parently accepting market share theory in principle, but rejecting particular application). 
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Secondly, and more importantly, profits in most cases are not what 
the antitrust plaintiff really "lost." What the plaintiff lost was a par-
ticular opportunity to make profits. Profit-making opportunities are a 
function of a firm's assets - its buildings, equipment, trademarks, per-
sonality, management skills. An antitrust violation may deprive a 
plaintiff of some of these things, but almost never all of them. If the 
assets taken were restored, the opportunity to make profits would be 
restored as well. 
Our current system of estimating damages based on lost profits 
overcompensates to the extent that antitrust violations never deprive a 
plaintiff of everything that has made his or her investments profitable. 
Even the franchisee of a product whose trademarks are owned by the 
franchisor and who rents the franchisor's building does not lose every-
thing when the franchise is terminated. The franchisee retains her 
management skills, a name in the community, willingness to work, 
and perhaps even the loyalty of some employees. The franchisee's loss 
is the cost of reconstructing a position to earn similar profits. 134 
Loss of unrecoverable investment is inherently a better basis for 
estimating antitrust damages than lost profits. Not only is it easier to 
measure than lost profits, but it provides a better estimate of what the 
plaintiff really lost. Finally, it is more consistent with a model that 
tries to apply sanctions in such a way as to minimize the true social 
cost of monopoly in society. 
CONCLUSION 
Until now, antitrust scholars have almost unanimously agreed that 
a model of antitrust enforcement based exclusively on allocative effi-
ciency would result in substantially less enforcement than we have had 
in the past, or even than we now have. This proposition may be true, 
but it is not self-evident and needs to be proven. To date it has not 
been proven because those who have argued it have based their ideas 
about allocative efficiency on a mistaken estimate of the social cost of 
the kind of monopolizing activity that antitrust is concerned about. 
When the full social cost of monopoly is considered, much broader 
antitrust enforcement seems appropriate, including damage actions by 
134. For example, see Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985), a resale 
price maintenance case involving termination of the plaintiff's distributorship of the defendant's 
winches. The plaintiff continued in business selling a different brand of winches. The court 
approved an award of lost profits based on the differences between the number of Ramsey 
winches that would have been sold and the number of substitute winches that were actually sold. 
See also Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1974) (damage award based 
on future profits), cerL denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975). 
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competitors and potential competitors - groups that rightfully fall 
among antitrust's protected classes. 
APPENDIX 
CONGRESS' VIEW OF THE SHERMAN ACT'S PROTECTED CLASSES 
In preparing this Appendix, I have simply quoted or summarized 
every reference in the legislative history of the Sherman Act that dis-
cusses the nature of the injuries Congress had on its collective mind in 
enacting the legislation. I have arranged these under three headings: 
(1) statements that clearly show a concern about injury to consumers; 
(2) statements that clearly show a concern about injury to competitors; 
(3) statements that show a concern about injury, but are ultimately 
ambiguous about the nature of the injury or the identity of the victim. 
Within each category, the statements are listed chronologically. 
I. CONCERN WITH CONSUMER INJURIES 
The following statements from the Act's legislative history reflect 
concern with consumer injuries, 135 resulting from both wealth trans-
fers (Lande Model)136 and allocative inefficiency (Bork Model). 137 
- A Resolution reported by the House Committee on Manufactures 
asserted that "certain individuals and corporations ... have combined 
for the purpose of controlling or curtailing the production or supply 
[of some articles], and thereby increasing their price ·to the people of 
the country."138 
- A Senate Resolution directed inquiry into practices that "tend to 
foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the consumer of 
necessary articles."139 
- Senator Sherman's original bill was designed to condemn combi-
nations "made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free 
competition ... in the production, manufacture or sale of articles ... 
or which tend to advance the cost to the consumer of any of such 
articles."140 None of this language appeared in the bill that was finally 
passed as the Sherman Act. 
135. "Consumer" injuries is defined here to include (1) high prices to consumers that result 
from a monopoly or sellers' cartel, and (2) low prices to producers of inputs that might result 
from a rnonopsonist or buyers' cartel. Farmers, one important protected class of the Sherman 
Act, were generally seen as experiencing injuries of the second type. 
136. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 61. 
137. See R. BORK, supra note 24; Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 57. 
138. 19 CONG. REC. 719 (1888). 
139. Id. at 6041. 
140. S. 3445, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Aug. 14, 1888). 
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Senator Jones noted that "[t]he sugar trust has its 'long, felonious 
fingers' at this moment in every man's pocket . . . , deftly extracting 
with the same audacity the pennies from the pockets of the poor and 
the dollars.from the pockets of the rich." 141 If Senator Jones was re-
ferring to high sugar prices he was wrong; the price of sugar was at an 
all-time low. 142 Possibly he was referring to competitors rather than 
consumers. 
- Senator Sherman stated that the bill would not apply to a farm-
ers' boycott of trust products, but would apply to combinations 
formed "to advance the price of the necessaries of life."143 Did Sher-
man really mean to limit his bill to "necessaries of life"? That was 
generally the position of the common law. 144 
- Senator Turpie defined "trust" as a combination formed 
with the intention of holding and selling [commodities] at an enhanced 
price, by suppressing or limiting the supply and by other devices, so that 
the price of such trust commodity shall depend merely upon the agree-
ment made about it by those in the combination, without reference to the 
cost of its production. 145 
- Senator George stated that he was anxious for a bill against the 
large corporations and wealthy individuals who "dictate to the people 
of this country what they shall pay when they purchase, and what they 
shall receive when they sell."146 He then objected that the proposed 
bill would condemn "defensive" as well as offensive combinations -
e.g., an agreement among farmers not to buy jute bagging from the 
jute-bagging trust.147 
- Senator Sherman declared that "[i]t is sometimes said of these 
combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by better meth-
ods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost 
goes to the pockets of the producer."148 This statement is consistent 
with the proposition that Congress intended to prevent "unjust" 
wealth transfers to monopolists (Lande model), rather than consumer 
welfare, neoclassically defined (Bork model). 149 
- Senator Sherman quoted an earlier statement from Senator 
George that the trusts "increase beyond reason the cost of the neces-
141. 20 CONG. REC. 1457-58 (1889). 
142. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
143. 20 CONG. REC. 1458 {1889). 
144. See Hovenkamp, supra note 55. 
145. 21 CONG. REC. 137 (1889). 
146. 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889). 
147. Id. 
148. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890). 
149. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 61; R. BORK, supra note 24. 
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saries of life and business."150 
- Senator Vest inquired whether the steel-makers created their 
combination in order to raise the price of steel. 151 
- Senator Teller stated: 
When [Standard Oil interferes] with somebody who has sunk a well in 
Ohio and they run down the price of oil until they shut him up, he may 
have his remedy against them. But that is not what we are complaining 
of. We are complaining that ... Standard Oil Company has a tendency 
to reduce and destroy competition, and thereby, by destroying competi-
tion, to put up improperly the price of oiJ.152 
- Senator Stewart argued that, although the beef trust raised prices, 
the remedy was for the farmers to have a countervailing combination 
to raise the price of cattle. 153 He was apparently claiming that the beef 
trust simultaneously (1) raised resale beef prices and (2) lowered the 
price of cattle it purchased. How a cattle producers' cartel would 
lower the final price of beef, Senator Stewart did not explain. 
- Senator Spooner declared that the beef trust had resulted in 
increased consumer prices, and that the purpose of the sugar trusts 
was to do so as well.154 
- Senator Reagan argued that the cottonseed-oil trust simultane-
ously drove competitors out of business, raised the price of refined 
cottonseed oil, and lowered the price it paid for the raw product.155 
- Senator Morgan inquired whether there were combinations of 
doctors or lawyers for raising prices. 156 
- Representatives Culberson and Butterworth appear to have 
agreed that maximum resale price maintenance would be illegal under 
the Act if its purpose was to drive out competing dealers. 157 
- Representative Henderson opined that the beef trust had been 
able simultaneously to reduce the price it paid for cattle and raise the 
price it charged for beef.158 
- Representative Taylor opined that the beef trust simultaneously 
harmed both farmers and consumers. 159 
- Representative Heard opined that the beef trust "prostrated the 
150. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890). 
151. Id. at 2472. 
152. Id. at 2571. 
153. Id. at 2606. 
154. Id. at 2640. 
155. Id. at 2645. 
156. Id. at 2726. 
157. See id. at 4090. 
158. Id. at 4091. 
159. Id. at 4098. 
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live-stock interest of the West" by paying farmers low prices for 
beef. 160 
- Representative Fithian opined that trusts "enhance the price of 
commodities to the people beyond an honest profit."161 
- Representative Moore noted that trusts "put up the price of 
necessities." 162 
II. CONCERN WITH COMPETITOR INJURIES 
Senator Hoar, a principal author of the final bill known as the 
Sherman Act, moved to amend Senator Sherman's bill to read: 
If one of the purposes of any such arrangement, contract, agreement, 
trust, or combination shall be to compel any person, partnership, or cor-
poration to become a party thereto, or to cease from doing any lawful 
business, or to sell and dispose of any lawful business, . . . the person, 
partnership, or corporation injured thereby may sue .... 163 
This language, however, was never passed. 
- Senator Saulsbury believed Hoar's proposed amendment should 
be strengthened to cover not merely situations in which people are 
"compelled" to give up their businesses, but even to situations in 
which people are "induced by offers of stock," presumably in the trust 
combination, to give up their businesses. 164 Hoar then responded that 
Saulsbury's proposal "would apply not only to a harmful but to a mer-
itorious arrangement."165 Saulsbury's proposal did not pass. 
- Senator Sherman stated: 
I am not opposed to combinations in and of themselves; I do not care 
how much men combine for proper objects; but when they combine with 
a purpose to prevent competition, so that if a humble man starts a busi-
ness in opposition to them, solitary and alone, in Ohio or anywhere else, 
they will crowd him down and they will sell their product at a loss or 
give it away in order to prevent competition, ... then it is the duty of the 
courts to intervene and prevent it .... 166 
- Senator George stated: 
It is a sad thought to the philanthropist that the present system of pro-
duction and of exchange is having that tendency which is sure at some 
not very distant day to crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all 
small enterprises. This is being done now. We find everywhere over our 
land the wrecks of small, independent enterprises thrown in our path-
160. Id. at 4101. 
161. Id. at 4102. 
162. Id. at 5953. 
163. 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1889). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890). 
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way. So now the American Congress and the American people are 
brought face to face with this sad, this great problem: Is production, is 
trade, to be taken away from the great mass of the people and concen-
trated in the hands of a few men who, I am obliged to add, by the poli-
cies pursued by our Government, have been enabled to aggregate to 
themselves large, enormous fortunes?167 
- Senator Edmunds stated: 
I am in favor of the scheme . . . directed to the breaking up of great 
monopolies which get hold of the whole of a particular business or pro-
duction in the country and are enabled, therefore, to command every-
body, laborer, consumer, producer, and everybody else, as the sugar 
trust and the oil trust, and whatever. Although for the time being the 
sugar trust has perhaps reduced the price of sugar, and the oil trust cer-
tainly has reduced the price of oil immensely, that does not alter the 
wrong of the principle of any trust; and that ... is a phrase which covers 
every combination to get control of the life and the industry and the 
producing and the consuming classes of the country. I am in favor, most 
earnestly in favor, of doing everything that the Constitution of the 
United States has given Congress power to do, to repress and break up 
and destroy forever the monopolies of that character, because in the long 
run, however seductive they may appear in lowering prices to the con-
sumer for the time being, all human experience and all human philoso-
phy have proved that they are destructive of the public welfare and come 
to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies .... 16s 
- Senator George stated that "[b ]y the use of this organized force of 
wealth and money the small men engaged in competition with [the 
trusts] are crushed out, and that is the great evil at which all this legis-
lation ought to be directed."169 
- Representatives Culberson, Butterworth, and Burrows opined 
that resale price maintenance contracts were covered by the proposed 
Act because they prevent dealers from setting prices independently or 
penalize them if they do.110 
- Representative Bland argued that the beef trust compelled in-
dependent butchers to buy their beef from the trust rather than from 
independent dealers; if the butcher resisted, the trust set up a compet-
ing butcher shop and drove the independent butcher out of 
business. 171 
- Representative Mason argued: 
Some say that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced 
prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to 1 cent a barrel 
it would not right the wrong done to the people of this country by the 
167. Id. at 2598. 
168. Id. at 2726. 
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"trusts" which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest 
men from legitimate business enterprises. 172 
III. AMBIGUOUS REFERENCES 
Senator Reagan's original proposed bill banned "trusts," which 
were defined as, among other things, combinations carried out "[t]o 
limit, to reduce, or to increase the production or prices of merchandise 
or commodities," or "[t]o prevent competition in the manufacture, 
making, sale, or purchase of merchandise or commodities," or "[t]o 
create a monopoly."173 This language was never passed. 
- Senator Jones opined that the trusts have "been allowed to grow 
and fatten upon the public, ... preying upon every industry, and by 
their unholy combinations robbing their victims, the general pub-
lic." 174 "Preying upon every industry" seems to refer to competitor 
injury; "robbing their victims" may refer to either competitors or 
consumers. 
- Senator George denied that the purpose of combinations was to 
raise consumer prices. Rather, he argued, it was to play the market, 
"wholly for speculative purposes - intended alone to squeeze those 
who are 'short,' as the saying is. It is true they do, as an incident, 
sometimes affect, while they last, the price paid by the consumer; but 
that is not the intent .... " 175 Senator George then went on to say that 
in the unusual case where the combination really did raise prices, con-
sumers themselves and not middlemen would be injured, for even 
though the middlemen paid more, they would pass on their higher 
prices. However, consumer suits would not work as a practical mat-
ter. "[F]ew, if any, of such suits will ever be instituted, and none will 
ever be successful."176 He concluded that the bill was an "abortion," 
and, in any event, unconstitutional. 177 
- Senator Sherman requested the Chief Clerk to read his second 
amended bill, which gave a private antitrust action to "any person or 
corporation injured or damnified by such arrangement." The bill did 
not describe the nature of the injury.11s 
172. Id. at 4100. 
173. 19 CONG. REC. 7512 {1888). 
174. 20 CONG. REC. 1457 (1889). 
175. 21 CONG. REC. 1767 {1890). 
176. Id. at 1758. 
177. Id. at 1768. 
178. Id. at 2455. Senator Sherman added that the bill did not "seek to cripple combinations 
of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but only to prevent and 
control combinations made with a view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to 
increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer.'' Id. at 2457. 
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- Senator Sherman argued that his proposed bill 
does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production where there 
is free and fair competition. It is the right of every man to work, labor, 
and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his production on 
equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is indus-
trial liberty and lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and 
privileges. 179 
Later, he added: 
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition impossible. 
It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its 
selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down 
competition and advance prices at will where competition does not exist. 
Its governing motive is to increase the profits of the parties composing it. 
The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to dis-
regard the interest of the consumer.180 
Senator Sherman concluded, "The point for us to consider is whether, 
on the whole, it is safe in this country to leave the production of prop-
erty, the transportation of our whole country, to depend upon the will 
of a few men sitting at their council board in the city of New Yark 
•••• "
18 1 The perceived evils appear to be bigness per se and absentee 
ownership. 
- Senator Platt argued that the trusts were intended only to prevent 
ruinous competition and keep prices at a fair level. He stated that he 
was "sick of this idea that the lower the prices are the better for the 
country."182 Platt added: 
The true theory of this matter is that prices should be just and reasonable 
and fair, that prices, no matter who is the producer or what the article, 
should be such as will render a fair return to all persons engaged in its 
production, a fair profit on capital, on labor and of everything else .... 
When the price of any commodity ... is forced below that standard, the 
whole country suffers. 183 
Then Platt concluded that the trust form of business was the exception 
rather than the rule; most business, he noted, was still carried on by 
firms of relatively small capital. Further, his experience with woolen 
mills was that their efforts to combine were merely to prevent 
losses. 184 
- Senator George argued that consumer suits were not practical, 
for they would force consumers, whose individual injuries were small, 
179. Id. at 2457. 
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to travel long distances to find a forum with jurisdiction over the de-
fendants. "[H]ow can the small farmer thus injured from $10 to $50, 
with his witnesses, go to a distant town or city, employ a lawyer, and 
sue one of these great trusts in a United States court?"185 Finally, he 
concluded: 
I predict - and I put it on the record now as my deliberate judgment -
that not one suit will ever be brought under this seventh section by any 
person who is simply damaged in his character as consumer .... I do not 
propose silently to sit here and be a silent partner ... to the enactment of 
what I know to be, so far as a remedy to the real parties injured by these 
trusts is concerned, a sham, a snare, and a delusion. 186 
- Representative Wilson stated that "it is one of the subtleties of 
the trust system that it can always have on hand a supply of corpora-
tions to be used as light cavalry to chase down the first competitor that 
dares to appear to contest the dominion of the trust over the home 
market."187 
- Representatives Culberson and Oates debated the anti-pooling 
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act. The debate led Represen-
tative Oates to suggest that the effect had been merely to force smaller 
railroads to merge and to ask whether it "resulted in accomplishing 
just the contrary to what was expected."188 Representative Morse ex-
pressed the same opinion.189 
- Senator Stewart concluded that trusts, particularly the railroads, 
tended to reduce prices. The real problem, he said, was discrimina-
tion, or differential pricing, which was caused by competition. 190 
- Representative Anderson disagreed with Stewart, and concluded 
that railroad combinations increased rates.191 This same debate, be-
tween the same members, was later repeated.192 
- Senator Vest asserted that railroad cartels were designed to in-
crease rates rather than lower them. 193 
- Senator Kerr objected to the fact that the sugar trust was profita-
ble, but did not say why.194 
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